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Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA), or Flight Data Monitoring (FDM), has
benefited flight safety in both fixed-wing and helicopter operations. The relative youth of
FOQA programs has resulted in their minimal application among the helicopter fleets of
the world; thus, Helicopter FOQA (HFOQA) has merited consolidation and expansion.
This mixed methods design developed HFOQA analysis software via a blend of the
qualitative data from helicopter and FOQA experts with quantitative data represented by
a sample of de-identified digital flight data from 1,014 helicopter flights. Development of
the software emphasized three domains of interest: (a) helicopter flight phases; (b)
helicopter operational and maintenance events; and (c) helicopter event-related and
safety/efficiency flight profile measurements. This study's resultant HFOQA analysis
software has direct application to multifaceted helicopter operations (Emergency Medical
Services [EMS], sightseeing, military, and others), and, in fact, has been utilized by an
offshore helicopter operator in its daily operations.
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Chapter I
INTRODUCTION
Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA), a proactive aviation safety
program, has continually monitored digital aircraft flight data, irrespective of any
incident/accident occurrence. The routine collection and analysis of normal flight
operational data has increased safety and decreased costs (Flight Safety Foundation
[FSF], 2004). FOQA has provided a comprehensive, objective overview and risk
assessment capability of the aircraft operation - pilot performance, aircraft condition, and
the environment - in providing the aforementioned benefits (Federal Aviation
Administration [FAA], 2004). The waiting for a tragedy to occur to obtain operational
knowledge and prevent accidents has been obviated by FOQA.
FOQA also has existed under different names around the world, such as Flight
Data Monitoring (FDM) and Flight Data Analysis (FDA). The European commercial
airlines originally introduced the systematic and proactive use of flight data from routine
operations in the 1960s. Since then, this safety assessment process has gained acceptance
due to the advancing technology and the expertise shared throughout the industry. In the
United States (U.S.), during the 1990s, the airlines began to establish a similar program
and became familiar with its advantages. In recent years, the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) has approved FOQA as a standard for some commercial transport
aircraft beginning January 1, 2005 (FSF, 2004).
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Air carriers with FOQA implemented in their fixed-wing fleet have seen several
benefits of continuously monitoring flights. The direct benefits have been the
improvement of safety, training, operational, and maintenance procedures. At the same
time, problems with Air Traffic Control (ATC) procedures, airport characteristics, and
aircraft operation and design were brought forward and addressed. Some financial
considerations and cost savings have also been mentioned; for example, insurance and
fuel savings (FSF, 2004).
FOQA has been consolidated, earned trust, and assisted stakeholders within the
air carrier industry during the execution of business. It has become unavoidable to ask
whether the program will extend its range beyond the fixed-wing industry; the helicopter
market with its diverse operational characteristics has already had some affirmative
answers.
Large numbers of rotorcraft have participated in a broad variety of aviation
activities. According to FAA registration data, an estimated 10,844 civil rotorcraft were
active in the U.S. at the end of October 2005; 2.265 million hours were flown in 2005.
The total market value of used helicopters traded in U.S. in 2005, for example, was
$783.9 million (Helicopter Association International [HAI], 2006). This impressive
volume of activity and wealth has necessitated safety operations.
The U.S. civil helicopter (non-commercial and commercial) accident rate was
8.09 accidents per 100,000 flight hours in 2004 and 8.52 in 2005. The latter accident rate
was based upon National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) accidents posted through
mid-December 2005 (HAI, 2006). The commercial helicopter accident rate was 2.25
accidents per 100,000 hours in 2004. All these numbers have been more or less static for
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the past decade and were "too high" and "not appropriate" (R. Flater as cited in Klein,
2006, p. 1). Iseler and De Maio (2001), using the number of departures as the exposure
factor in their analysis of U.S. civil rotorcraft accidents from 1990 to 1996, stated that
"the airline fatal and total accidents rates are about one tenth those of the corresponding
helicopter rates" (p. 1). The HAI and the American Helicopter Society (AHS) announced
on January 31, 2006 the formation of a consortium of operators, manufacturers, and
government regulatory agencies; the International Helicopter Safety Team (IHST) has
been tasked to reduce helicopter accidents 80% by 2016 (IHST, 2006b).
Public transportation by helicopter has presented unique characteristics that
increase the risk of the operation and also deserve to be routinely mapped utilizing
objective data. Emergency Medical Services (EMS) aviation operations, sightseeing
helicopter flights, and offshore helicopter operations have provided significant
representation.
EMS flights, for example, have occurred under the natural pressure of quickly
transporting patients or donor organs to emergency care facilities. The hazards associated
with EMS operations have resulted in an increasing number of accidents which has not
been seen since the 1980s. Between January 2002 and January 2005, 16 EMS helicopter
fatal accidents occurred in the United States, killing 39 people (NTSB, 2006d).
The air tour industry has its own uniqueness. In one instance, an accident
investigation report indicated that a sightseeing helicopter crew succumbed to pressure to
fly in bad weather in 1999. The NTSB reported that helicopter flights were included in
more than half of 19 sightseeing flight fatal accidents, killing 43 people, since January
2000 (Klein, 2006).
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Offshore helicopter operations (to be discussed further) have been distinguished
by over-water flights in an oil and gas environment, including turbulence and hot gas
areas. All three aforementioned types of public transportation might have regularly
occurred close to terrain or water, in severe weather, or at unfamiliar landing sites, and
are highly subject to environmental conditions. Therefore, they have been inherently
dangerous operations and an efficient hazard assessment and risk control program is
needed (NTSB, 2006d).
The worldwide offshore helicopter operations, in particular, have been impressive
because of the numbers and characteristics involved. In 2004, 8.5 million passengers
were carried in oil industry helicopter operations (offshore, seismic, geophysical,
pipeline, and others activities), with 2.5 million flights worldwide (International
Association of Oil & Gas Producers [OGP], 2006). Clark (2000) compared the travel
scenarios and relative travel risk experienced by an airline business passenger in an
airplane and an offshore worker in a helicopter. The fixed-wing passenger flew at a high
altitude in air-conditioned comfort, preceded by a short briefing on the use of the seat belt
and lifejacket, and was advised on the nearest exit. The offshore worker, flew above
unforgiving freezing waters like the North Sea, must have had prior training on helicopter
underwater escape, and watched a detailed video on helicopter evacuation. The offshore
helicopter passenger wore a thermal liner, an immersion suit, and a lifejacket with selfbreathing equipment providing 15 to 20 seconds of air under water in case of ditching.
The helicopter flight was in a very loud, cramped, and high-vibration environment. To
escape underwater, a window beside the seat must be pushed out after releasing its seal.
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In summary, the accident risk that an offshore worker has faced has been significantly
higher than that of a regular airline passenger.
The Gulf of Mexico has encompassed the largest offshore helicopter fleet in the
world with a total of 589 aircraft in 2005 (Williams, 2006). This fleet has been
responsible for 71% of the offshore flights and 42% of worldwide flight hours, according
to 2004 data from OGP (2006). These statistics emphasize the importance of keeping this
flight operations area safe. However, the accident rate and other safety numbers have not
been improving. The Helicopter Safety Advisory Conference (HSAC; Williams, 2006)
stated that 2004, with 15 lives lost, was the worst year in terms of fatalities in the 21
years of gathering data in the Gulf of Mexico. The helicopter accident rate per 100,000
flight hours in 2005 was 2.05. That has been a particularly unsatisfactory number when
compared to the 22-year annual average accident rate of 1.89. The Gulf of Mexico
numbers have evolved to accident rates notably higher than those of the North Sea.
The North Sea has had the second largest offshore helicopter fleet with 100
aircraft, covering 10% of worldwide flights and 15% of the total worldwide hours flown.
In contrast to the current Gulf of Mexico accident rate, a fairly constant diminishing
accident rate has been observed in the North Sea. Despite the fact that the North Sea
operations have been carried out over longer distances and often in more severe weather,
no accidents have occurred during the last 2 years of available data - 2003 and 2004. The
most recent offshore helicopter accident in the North Sea occurred in 2002; the accident
rate per 100,000 flight hours for that year was 1.96 (OGP, 2006).
A closer look at the North Sea safety approach to offshore helicopter operations
has been revealing. The United Kingdom (UK) Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) has been
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promoting safety review meetings with the industry in order to develop and guarantee
helicopter airworthiness for public transportation (Howson, 2005). A partnership among
the offshore helicopter stakeholders of the UK has resulted in extensive research to
improve safety. The ongoing research process resulted in the creation of the Helicopter
Operations Monitoring Programme (HOMP), which was the first FOQA-type program
applied to helicopters (CAA, 2002).
The HOMP project began as a trial in 1999; two related, final reports were
released in 2002 and 2004 by the CAA. Two offshore helicopter operators and two
different types of helicopters participated in the HOMP trial. The application of FOQA to
helicopter operations was considered a success. Consequently, the UK Offshore
Operators Association (UKOOA) committed its members to implement the program on
all Flight Data Recorder (FDR)-equipped UK public transport helicopters over the UK
Continental Shelf (UKCS; CAA, 2002). Moreover, Shell Oil Company has recently
required a FOQA-type program in its contract with a European helicopter operator on
some helicopters that the company has used in the North Sea (Croft, 2005).
Although FOQA has already proven to be a feasible tool and a safety advantage
for offshore helicopters operators, the aviation industry has been awaiting its
consolidation and subsequent expansion. The course of FOQA development progress
with helicopters has been forecast to follow that of fixed-wing FOQA. The HOMP trial
was the first step and the basis for this study. FOQA analysis software suppliers, highly
experienced in the field, have started transferring know-how and familiarizing themselves
with this powerful helicopter safety tool.
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Statement of the Problem
FOQA has attained the status of a powerful aviation safety tool that increases
flight safety and efficiency in both fixed-wing and helicopter operations. The relative
youth of FOQA programs has resulted in their minimal application as tools among the
helicopter fleets of the world. Current helicopter FOQA analysis software programs have
arrived at a point in time where they merit consolidation and expansion.

Delimitations
The exclusive focus of this study has been the FOQA analysis software. The
development of a helicopter version of the FOQA software addressed both operational
and maintenance parameters. Although the industry has usually referred to the latter as
Maintenance Operational Quality Assurance (MOQA), this study has concentrated on
maintenance as well as flight operations under the FOQA rubric.
The analyzed flight data were historical and used solely as a means of verification
and validation. No safety or efficiency appraisal was made regarding the quality of the
helicopter operations that produced the data. Moreover, the flight data and the software
ownership have remained confidential. Additionally, the costs associated with the
helicopter FOQA have not been assessed.

Definition of Terms
The following list of key terms and their definitions has been prepared as a quick
reference to facilitate reading of the report.
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Dead Man's Curve (DMC) or height velocity curve: A chart (height on the y-axis
and velocity on the x-axis) depicting combinations of airspeed and altitude that do not
provide sufficient stored energy to permit a safe landing of the helicopter in the event of
an engine failure (Cantrell, 2006).
Event: An occurrence or condition in which predetermined limits of aircraft
parameters have been exceeded (FAA, 2004).
Fixed-wing aircraft: A generic term used to refer to what are more commonly
known as airplanes (Wikipedia Encyclopedia, 2006)
Flight Data Analysis (FDA): "Flight Data Analysis (FDA) is the systematic
collection of flight data to improve safety and operational efficiency" (IATA, 2004, ^fl).
Flight Data Monitoring (FDM): "Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) is the
systematic, pro-active, and non-punitive use of digital flight data from routine operations
to improve aviation safety" (CAA, 2003, p. 1).
Flight Data Recorder (FDR): A device that records pertinent parameters and
technical information about a flight. A FDR is designed to withstand the forces of a crash
so that information recorded by it may be used to reconstruct the circumstances leading
up to the accident (FAA, 2004).
Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA): "A voluntary program for the
routine collection and analysis of flight operational data to provide more information
about, and greater insight into, the total flight operations environment. A FOQA program
combines these data with other sources and operational experience to develop objective
information to enhance safety, training effectiveness, operational procedures,
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maintenance and engineering procedures, and air traffic control (ATC) procedures"
(FAA, 2004, p. 4).
FOQA, FDMf or FDA: Different acronyms for aviation safety programs that make
use of digital, recorded aircraft flight data, even if no accident occurs (Author).
Ground resonance: Emergency situation developed when the helicopter rotor
blades move out of phase with each other and cause the rotor disc to become unbalanced.
This phenomenon has resulted in the entire hull being ripped apart by the aircraft's own
extreme oscillations (Lewis & Darbo, 2006).
Helicopter FOQA (HFOQA): The adaptation of the FOQA process, emphasizing
the development of unique analysis software to be used by the helicopter industry in any
of its multifaceted operations (Author).
Helicopter Operations Monitoring Programme (HOMP): A North Sea helicopter
version of fixed-wing FOQA programs (Author).
Helideck: Offshore industry terminology for the heliport(s)/helipad(s) located on
the offshore drilling rigs (Author).
Parameter exceedance analysis or event detection: The examination for aircraftparameters beyond predetermined thresholds in a specific occurrence, or a programmed
event (FAA, 2004).
Parameters: "Measurable variables that supply information about the status of an
aircraft system or subsystem, position, or operating environment. Parameters are
collected by a data acquisition unit installed on the aircraft and then sent to analysis and
reporting systems" (FAA, 2004, p. 5).
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Quick Access Recorder (QAR): A recording unit onboard the aircraft that stores
flight-recorded data, and are designed to provide quick and easy access to the data (FAA,
2004).
Safety Management System (SMS): The effective and comprehensive safety
structure developed and maintained by an air transport organization for managing safety,
through an inclusive safety culture (CAA, 2003).
Special Event Search and Master Analysis (SESMA): "The first ever FDM
system" (CAA, 2002, Section 3, p. 1).
Statistical analysis or routine flight data measurement: The statistical use of data
from all flights to determine risk for an airline without focusing on specific event
exceedances (FAA, 2004).
Validation: "The process of determining that the requirements are the correct
requirements and that they are complete" (CAA, 2003, Appendix A, p. 2).
Verification: "The evaluation of the results of a process to ensure correctness and
consistency with respect to the input and standards provided to that process" (CAA,
2003, Appendix A, p. 2).

Chapter II
REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE
The helicopter industry has not entirely incorporated the same improvements in
design, equipment, operating procedures, training, and maintenance practices as the
airline industry. A large number of helicopters have been operated with the same criteria
and procedures that the air carriers' aircraft were 30 years ago. The key steps that the
airlines have taken to improve their safety could be replicated by helicopters with similar
effects (Stevens & Sheffield, 2006).

FOQA and the Airline Industry
The aviation industry represented by the airlines has strengthened its business and
public credibility through a long-term investment in safety. Extraordinary advances in
aircraft airworthiness, airport and navigation facilities, air traffic management, and pilot
training through high-fidelity flight simulator devices, for example, reduced the accident
rates significantly in the past (Matthews, 2002). These features have already been
incorporated into the airline industry and their roles continue to exist within the system.
However, the increasing numbers of flights over the years has caused the airline industry
to not accept the current low accident rates. More flights have represented more accidents
and losses if the number of accidents per flight has remained the same as the past (FAA,
2004). FOQA, incorporated into a Safety Management System (SMS), has been
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highlighted as one of the safety programs with the potential to minimize the low, but
steady, long-term accident rate per airline departures (FSF, 2004).

SMS and FOQA
The SMS has been generally defined as the effective and comprehensive safety
structure developed and maintained by an air transport organization for managing safety.
A commitment to minimizing the risk of flight operations through an inclusive safety
culture has been the focus of the SMS. An effective SMS has relied basically on
information obtained from all sources available from the aviation industry to predict risks
(CAA, 2003); an example has been the information from voluntary, non-punitive incident
and hazard reporting programs (CAA, 2002). Regulatory authorities and organizations
involved with air transportation safety have geared their plans and actions to achieve
safety in a partnership culture with the industry. The capability of the SMS and Oversight
Systems to collect, integrate, and analyze data from different sources has been the major
trend initiative demonstrated in projects for the future. The FAA has planned to establish
a full SMS and Oversight System by 2008. The ICAO target date for SMS and Safety
Management Oversight Systems implementation has been 2011. In the U.S., the Next
Generation of Air Transport System (NGATS), with full integration and linking among
federally related air transport agencies, has been projected for 2025 (D. Farrow, personal
communication, January 21, 2006).
FOQA has delivered objective, quantitative data from the airlines of the world to
the SMSs. The program has been included in operators' overall operational risk
assessment and prevention programs. FOQA data, obtained from special acquisition
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devices, such as Quick Access Recorders (QARs), or directly from the Flight Data
Recorders (FDRs), have discovered and addressed risk, thereby enhancing air safety
(FAA, 2004).

FOQA Definition
The primary characteristic that has distinguished FOQA from other safety
reporting programs has been that FOQA has provided objective, quantitative data. The
program, instead of relying on perceived problems or risks subjectively reported by
individuals, has yielded precise information on many aspects of flight operations. Such
information has been used to objectively evaluate a wide range of safety-related issues
(General Accounting Office [GAO], 1997).
The FSF (2004) has defined the FOQA program as the process of obtaining and
analyzing data recorded in flight operations to improve safety. The CAA (2003) has
emphasized the systematic, pro-active, and non-punitive use of the program. Nonpunitive has meant that information obtained from FOQA would not be used, for
example, as the basis for a disciplinary action against a pilot (FSF, 2004). In the U.S., the
FAA (2004) has additionally addressed the voluntary aspects of the program and the
protection assurance of the submitted data, under Title 14 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (14 CFR) Part 193. "Protection of data sources" has meant that "data could
not be disclosed publicly or for purposes other than aviation safety" (FSF, 2004, p. 2).
ICAO and its 188 contracting states, followed by the European Aviation Safety Agency
(EASA), have ratified the FOQA data protection issue (Wall, 2006).
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FOQA History
At least eight non-U.S. airlines have had FOQA/FDM programs in operation for
more than 34 years (GAO, 1997, p. 20). A forerunner of British Airways and TAP Air
Portugal have received credit as the first airlines in the world to use FDM techniques
during the early 1960s (FSF, 2004). The CAA (2002) proclaimed that the FDM history
has been in alignment with one of its "longest miming safety research projects: the Civil
Aircraft Airworthiness Data Recording Programme (CAADRP)" (Section 3, p. 1). The
CAADRP's efforts to improve aviation safety through FDM in the 1960s relied on flight
data recorders with ultraviolet paper as the medium to collect data from the jet transports
then entering service. This diligent work "led to the development of the Special Event
Search and Master Analysis (SESMA) program - the first ever FDM system" (Section 3,
p. 1). SESMA has developed into the British Airways' FDM program and an essential
component of the airline's SMS.
British Airways' FDM program has served as the model for similar programs in
the U.S. and around the world (GAO, 2002). For example, in Asia, All Nippon Airways
began a program to analyze flight data in 1974 and Japan Airline's FOQA program has
been in effect for more than 24 years (GAO, 1997). In the 1980s and 1990s many nonU.S. airlines shared their FOQA expertise in seminars and workshops promoted by the
FSF. In a 1993 study for the FAA, the FSF coined the term Flight Operational Quality
Assurance and stated that there were "approximately 25 air carriers with FOQA-like
programs" worldwide (FSF, 2004, p. 2).
In July 1995, the FAA initiated a 3-year $5.5 million FOQA Demonstration
Project (DEMOPROJ) to encourage the voluntary implementation of FOQA programs by
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U.S. airlines. The FAA project initially provided hardware and software to US Airways,
United Airlines, and Continental Airlines, which met the DEMOPROJ requirements
(GAO, 2002). Other airlines began to consider FOQA programs; by 1997, about 33
foreign airlines and four U.S. airlines had implemented FOQA or FOQA-type programs
(GAO, 1997).
From 1997 to 2004, the FAA worked together with the Department of Justice and
aviation industry stakeholders to develop a proposed FOQA rule that would be acceptable
to all interested parties. In 2001, the 14 CFR Part 193 became effective and provided
protection to U.S. air carriers from enforcement actions based on FOQA data; in 2004 the
FOQA Advisory Circular (AC) was published by the FAA. According to the FSF (2004),
the FOQA AC has provided "the most complete guidance yet for U.S. air carriers on
acceptable methods of establishing a FOQA program with all the available regulatory
protections" (p. 2). (An amplified timeline of notable events pertaining to the evolution of
FOQA has been delineated within Table 1.)
Since the 1960s, the number of airlines that have implemented FOQA has risen
steadily. Femandes (2002) affirmed that approximately 70 air carriers worldwide had
established fully operational FOQA/FDM programs by that year. (The FSF [2004] added
that another 50 carriers were at various stages of establishing programs during that time.)
These numbers evolved partially as a result of ICAO involvement. ICAO recommended
implementation of FOQA on aircraft certificated with a Gross Takeoff Weight (GTW) of
more than 20,000 kilograms (44,000 pounds) effective January 1, 2002. ICAO and EASA
later ratified FOQA as a standard on airplanes with a maximum GTW greater than 27,000
kilograms (60,000 pounds) effective January 1, 2005 (FSF, 2004).
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Table 1
FOQA Timeline (Adaptedfrom the GAO, 2002; CAA, 2002; and FSF, 2004)
Date
Agency/Industry
Action
Early 1960s

British Airways / CAA
TAP Air Portugal

Inaugurate use of FOQA programs.

1974

All Nippon Airways

Begins a program to analyze flight data.

1980s and
1990s

FSF

Non-U.S. airlines shared their FOQA expertise in seminars
and workshops.

1993

FSF

Publishes study recognizing that acceptance of FOQA
programs by the aviation industry hinges on adequate
protection of data collected.

March 1993

FAA

Begins rulemaking effort. However, progress quickly stalled
by airline concerns about FAA's intended use of FOQA data.

July 1995

FAA

1997

DOJ

1997-2004

FAA and DOJ

1998

FAA

July 2000

FAA

A
* ™™
August 2000

Jo m t service safety
J
,.f

Formally endorse military FOQA programs (MFOQA), and
recommend full funding for their implementation.

July 2001

FAA

Rule issued protecting voluntarily submitted aviation safety
and security data are protected from release under Freedom
of Information Act.

October 2001

FAA and DOT

Publication of final FOQA rule.

November 2001

FAA

14 CFR Part 13 FOQA data inviolable.

September 2003

FAA

14 CFR Part 193 FOQA participant confidentiality.

2004

FAA

AC 120-82 FOQA programs.

Begins a FOQA demonstration project and issues statement
indicating commitment to using FOQA data for safety
analysis purposes only.
Cautioned FAA that a federal regulator may not be able to
exempt regulated parties from enforcement actions, even
information is submitted voluntarily.
Work together to develop a proposed FOQA rule that would
be acceptable to all stakeholders.
Publishes a policy statement indicating intent to use FOQA
data for enforcement purposes, but only when rule violations
are egregious.
Formally publishes a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on
voluntary implementation of FOQA programs by U.S.
airlines.
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Thus, FOQA has become a well established practice among fixed-wing operators,
having demonstrated enhanced safety and other benefits. The growth in the number of
airlines utilizing FOQA has been illustrated by Figure 1.
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Figure 1. The Growth of the Number of Airlines that Implemented FOQA Techniques
throughout the Years (Adapted from Fernandes, 2002).

FOQA Benefits
Post-crash analysis of FDR data has played a crucial role in determining accident
causes. As opposed to the post-accident or -incident use, FOQA has routinely examined
the digital data from uneventful airline flights to identify potential problems and correct
them before they lead to accidents (GAO, 1997). The most important benefits from
FOQA have certainly been safety related (CAA, 2002).
The detection of "technical flaws, unsafe practices, or conditions outside of
desired operating procedures" (GAO, 1997, p. 1) has allowed improvement in "flight

18
crewmembers' performance, air carrier training programs, operating procedures, air
traffic control (ATC) procedures, airport maintenance and design, aircraft operations and
design" (FSF, 2004, pp. 1-2). The Global Aviation Information Network (GAIN) stated
that "a successful FOQA program encourages adherence to standard operating procedures
(SOPs), deters nonstandard behavior and so enhances flight safety" (FSF, 2004, p. 2).
The CAA (2002) illustrated FOQA safety-related benefits with the results of a
study by Scandia Insurance. The report compared FAA data to associated data from nonU.S. airlines as illustrated by Figure 2. The comparison underscored that airlines using
FOQA data for 7-14 years had a lower accident rate than the U.S. airlines. Those airlines
that used FOQA for more than 14 years had an accident rate less than half the rate
experienced by the U.S. carriers.
Hull Losses as a Percent of Total Turbine Fleet. FOQA user vs. U.S.
vs. World
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Figure 2. Safety Benefits of FOQA (Adapted from CAA, 2002).
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The FSF (2004) presented flight operational issues that have been addressed by
the airlines utilizing FOQA analysis:
Air carriers with FOQA programs have used flight data to identify problems such
as unstabilized approaches and rushed approaches; exceedance of flap limit
speeds; excessive bank angles after takeoff; engine over-temperature events;
exceedance of recommended speed thresholds; ground-proximity warning system
(GPWS)/terrain awareness and warning system (TAWS) warnings; onset of stall
conditions; excessive rate of rotation; glide path excursions; and vertical
acceleration, (p. 2)
Another range of possibilities has been related to the scope of FOQA successes.
For example:
1. The FSF (2004) described FOQA analysis as having been used to determine
that "aircraft problems were induced by runway surface conditions" (p. 18).
2. Excessive tire wear resulted from ATC instructions to land and hold short of
an intersection runway.
3. An instrument approach was causing unstabilized approaches and should be
redesigned.
4. Minimum radar-vectoring altitudes in mountainous terrain should be
increased, preventing GPWS warnings.
5. Pilot training on GPWS escape maneuvers should be improved.
6. Air carriers' warranty claims to airframe, engine, and equipment
manufacturers and air carriers' insurance premiums reduction requests were
reasonable ones.
Although the improvement of flight safety has been the driving force behind
FOQA (FAA, 2004), the airline industry has seen cost-related benefits as well. Falcon
(2003) stated that US Airways revealed that FOQA resulted in more than $100 million in
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maintenance savings in 5 years; ". . . its aircraft engines were frequently operating at
higher than recommended temperatures. Since implementing FOQA, those overtemps
have been reduced by 87 percent" fl| 1). "Delta Airlines also experienced significant
procedure improvements after putting FOQA into practice, reducing flap over-speeds
[sic] (employing wing flaps at higher than recommended speeds) from 46 to 10
occurrences per quarter" (Falcon, 2003, f 2).
The CAA (2003) summarized the following examples of where FOQA data has
produced cost savings, in addition to safety improvements, for a wide range of operators:
1. Engine savings - ECM [Engine Condition Monitoring] - Postponed/reduced
removals, recording of use of derate.
2. Fuel savings - trim analysis, airframe differences.
3. Fuel tankering - more accurate burn calculations.
4. Brake savings - better crew awareness and highlighting heavy use.
5. Flap maintenance savings - fewer overspeeds and use as a "drag flap."
6. Inspections savings - reduced number required due to availability of
maximum values for heavy landings, engine overtemp' [sic], flap placard, etc.
7. Safety savings - improved safety estimated from probable hull loss rates.
8. Insurance savings - based on experience of long term FDM operators.
9. Increased aircraft availability - better/faster fault diagnosis.
10. Repair savings - reduced numbers of tailstrikes, heavy landings, etc.
11. Reduced ACARS [Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting
System] costs - ECMS [Environmental Control and Monitoring System] and
other data collection from QAR.
12. Increased simulator effectiveness - better targeted.
13. ETOPS [Extended Twin Engine Operations] monitoring - automatic rather
than manual.
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14. Warranty support - definitive usage evidence.
15. Autoland support - record keeping and system health/accuracy. (Appendix E,
pp. 2-3)

FOQA Process and Key Elements
The CAA (2002) affirmed that the objective of FOQA systems was to enable an
airline to identify, quantify, assess, and address operational risks through the "closed
loop" process shown in Figure 3.

Continuously
Identify and
quantify risks

yes
Was action
effective?

No

yes

Are risks
acceptable?

Take remedial
action

Figure 3. The "Closed Loop" FOQA Process (Adapted from CAA, 2003).

FOQA data have typically originated from various onboard systems and sensors
throughout the aircraft (GAO, 1997). The Flight Data Acquisition Unit (FDAU) and the
QAR, utilizing either a Personal Computer Memory Card International Association
(PCMCIA) card or an optical disk cartridge as a storage device, have gathered, processed,
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and managed the digital data representing multiple parameters of flight. The FAA (2004)
provided an overview of the total process from the data capture through the data analysis
and utilization.
In the FAA-described FOQA routine, data have been periodically retrieved and
sent to the air carrier's FOQA office for analysis, using one of several available
transmission methods. The methods for transferring data have been ground-based
transportation, electronic, or wireless transmission; all have required close coordination
and the retrieval time period has needed to coincide with the recording medium's
memory capacity. The FOQA office has been located within the flight safety organization
of the air carrier. There, the data have then been validated and analyzed using specialized
processing and analysis software, known as the Ground Data Replay and Analysis
System (GDRAS). The validation process has been the data review "to see that they were
not generated as a result of erroneous recording or damaged sensors" (FAA, 2004, p. 3).
The two analysis techniques applied to FOQA data have been (a) the parameter
exceedance analysis, or event detection, and (b) statistical analysis, or routine flight data
measurement (2004). There has also been some usage of FOQA data for incident
investigation.
The parameter exceedance analysis or event detection has involved examination
for aircraft-parameters beyond predetermined thresholds in a specific occurrence, or a
programmed event, during various phases of flight. For example, a GDRAS event could
be programmed to detect each time the aircraft bank angle (the parameter analyzed)
exceeded 35 degrees, as displayed in Figure 4. These data could be trended over multiple
flights to determine the number of abnormal events occurring per flight segment. In
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addition, the data could be trended to determine phase of flight, airport, or runway, if
appropriate, depending on the event type. Levels of exceedance have been programmed
for particular events, based on the operator's risk assessment, to assist in focusing
resources on corrective action in the highest perceived operational risk area(s) (FAA,
2004).
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Figure 4. Parameter Exceedance Analysis, or Event Detection, of Bank Angle Greater
than 35 Degrees.

Statistical analysis, or routine flight data measurement, has been used to create
flight profiles. The profiles have used several measurements to build distributions of
various criterion parameters. The distributions of data have shown all flights and enabled
a carrier to determine risk based on the means and the standard deviations. One area of
flight operations carriers have analyzed has been final approach tracks. A profile has
typically been designed to measure the different criteria of an approach. Parameters
involved have been airspeed, rate of descent, configuration, and power setting. For
example, the GDRAS has captured the maximum airspeed of every flight on final
approach. The distributions "painted a picture" of the performance of each flight. The
carrier was then able to determine when an approach track resulted in an unstable
approach or landing (FAA, 2004).

;
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Similar to parameter exceedance analysis, routine flight data measurement has
utilized data distributions to "drill down" and examine the phase of flight (as displayed in
Figure 5), the airport, or the aircraft type. The value of using statistical analysis has been
that data from all flights have been used to determine risk for an airline without focusing
on specific event exceedances. The use of data distributions has developed a risk
assessment process by establishing a baseline for trending data and determining critical
safety concerns. Statistical analysis has been a means to determine the total performance
of an airline's operation and root causes of systemic problems (FAA, 2004).
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In summary, FOQA personnel utilizing GDRAS have extracted abnormal events,
or exceedances, and routine operational measurements. Ultimately, these analyses were
presented to those airline departments (stakeholders) that were recipients of the safety
improvements and continued airworthiness benefits (CAA, 2003). Features of the
GDRAS have enabled the FOQA analysts to present elaborate operational reports and
flight animations. Details of the cyclical nature of the FOQA process have been
illustrated in Figure 6.
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Figure 6. The FOQA Cyclical Process (Adapted from S. Wellington).

The entire FOQA process has been characterized by confidentiality. The flight
crewmember identity has been removed from view (de-identified) in the electronic record
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as part of the initial processing of the airborne data. However, a gatekeeper, charged with
the primary responsibility for the security of the identified data, has been able to link
FOQA data to an individual flight or crewmember. This capability has been provided "for
a limited period of time, in order to enable follow-up inquiry with the specific flight crew
associated with a particular FOQA event" (FAA, 2004, p. 8). Gatekeeper identification of
the flight and/or the crewmembers has been limited to situations where further insight
into the circumstances surrounding an event was needed.

Helicopters
Rotorcraft have participated in a broad variety of aviation activities in our society.
These activities have included not only the day-to-day routine helicopter transportation,
but also those in support of relief efforts during emergency situations. The non-helicopter
community could clearly perceive the importance of helicopter deployment during the
catastrophes of September 11, 2001, the December 26, 2004 tsunami, Hurricane Katrina
on August 29, 2005, and the Pakistan earthquake on October 8, 2005.
Approximately 265 representatives from the helicopter manufacturing industry,
the military and civil operators, and the international regulatory communities attended the
International Helicopter Safety Symposium (IHSS) 2005 in Montreal, Canada. The
purpose of the meeting was to discuss the need for an international collaborative effort to
reduce both civil and military accidents in the vertical flight industry. The two most
significant achievements of IHSS 2005 were acknowledgment by all participants that the
helicopter accident rate had been excessive and unsustainable, and the collaborative effort
by all should be able to reduce that rate by 80% (Stevens & Sheffield, 2006).
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A comparison among accident rates of different types of operations throughout
the aviation industry provided a glance of the current risk involved in helicopter
operations. Figure 7 has displayed accident rates used as benchmarks by the aviation
industry. Although comparisons based only on accident rate calculations have not
provided the most accurate picture (Wood, 2003), they have been sufficient to motivate
efforts toward improved helicopter operation safety. In order to obtain a better overview
of the current helicopter world, EMS, sightseeing, and offshore operations were
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separated, and some safety-related data were stated for each type of operation,
considering their differences in equipment, mission, and/or environment.

EMS
In January 2006, the NTSB released a Special Investigation Report on EMS
Operations. It stated that between January 2002 and January 2005, 41 EMS helicopter
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accidents occurred in the U.S., 16 of which were fatal, resulting in a total of 39 fatalities
and 13 serious injuries - numbers that had not been seen since the 1980s (NTSB, 2006d).
The number of hours flown by EMS helicopter operations has increased
substantially over the years. For example, EMS helicopters flew about 162,000 flight
hours in 1991 and an estimated 300,000 flight hours in 2005. Due to the increased
number of hours flown, with the accident rate per flight hours over the years having
remained a constant, the absolute number of accidents would be increased by
approximately 85%. However, the average accident rate has also increased from 3.53
accidents per 100,000 flight hours between 1992 and 2001 to 4.56 accidents per 100,000
flight hours between 1997 and 2001. The absolute number of real accidents has become
an incredible statistic. The numbers of EMS aircraft (helicopters and airplanes) accidents
for the 15-year period from 1990 to 2005 has been displayed in Figure 8.
As a result, the NTSB investigated a group of EMS accidents in detail and
identified recurring safety issues. These issues included "lack of aviation flight risk
evaluation programs for EMS operations" and "no requirements to use technologies such
as terrain awareness and warning systems (TAWS) to enhance EMS flight safety"
(NTSB, 2006d, p. vii). The NTSB (2006d) also claimed that despite the FAA's positive
steps to improve EMS operational safety, the FAA has not yet imposed any requirements
for all EMS aircraft operators concerning risk management, or the use of current
technologies. "Although the Board recognizes that the nature of EMS operations involves
some risks, operators should be required to provide the best available tools to minimize
those risks and help medical personnel, flight crews, and patients arrive at their
destinations safely" (p. xi).

Year

Total Injuries
Number of
Number of fatal
accidents
accidents
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Serious

Minor

1990

1

0

0

0

0

1991

1

1

4

0

0

1992

3

2

3

4

0

1993

3

2

5

3

3

1994

4

2

6

0

3

1995

5

1

3

0

2

1996

5

3

9

1

0

1997

3

1

4

0

0

1998

11

2

8

5

5

1999

6

0

0

6

0

2000

6

2

7

0

4

2001

13

1

1

2

2

2002

13

6

14

8

4

2003

19

3

3

2

16

2004

19

9

29

7

3

2005

13

6

13

5

5

Figure 8. EMS Aircraft (Helicopters and Airplanes) Accidents for the 15-Year Period
from 1990 to 2005 (Adapted from NTSB, 2006d).

Sightseeing Helicopter Flight
The occurrence of accidents in the sightseeing-flight community has been of
similar concern:
The N.T.S.B. has recorded more than 140 sightseeing-flight accidents nationally
since January 2000, 19 of them fatal. The accidents were split almost evenly
among helicopters, balloons and small planes, but helicopter flights made up more
than half of the fatal crashes, killing 43 people, 24 in Hawaii. (Klein, 2006, p. 1)
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This high rate of accidents prompted the FAA to begin formulating regulations
called the National Air Tour Safety Standards in October 2003. The proposed rules have
required operators to equip their aircraft with floats and passengers to wear uninflated life
vests before flights over water. The regulations have been expected to be finalized in the
summer of 2006. However, organizations such as Tour Operators Program of Safety
(TOPS) and Alaska's 5-year-old Medallion Foundation have recognized that operating
beyond the proposed regulations has been determined as prudent, as well as more
attention to the human factor in accidents.
Klein (2006) aggregated expert information on sightseeing industry safety and
some industry initiatives implemented in order to improve safety. The FAA and
insurance companies claimed that "the aircraft were only a small part of the problem, and
that poor decisions by tour companies and their pilots - often involving weather - caused
most helicopter accidents" (p. 2). In Alaska, officials have credited Capstone, an FAA
program designed to improve safety through better terrain mapping and weather
technology, with reducing aviation accident rates; the last air tour fatality in the state was
in May 2003. Las Vegas-based Sundance Helicopters, on the other hand, after a 7passenger fatality in the Grand Canyon in 2003 began placing unannounced check pilots
on flights. These audits were designed to monitor the flights and report on discrepancies
(e.g., the pilot flew below 500 feet or exceeded the prescribed bank angle [Klein, 2006]).

Offshore Helicopter Operations
The helicopter safety performance data for the offshore oil industry segment has
been the most complete and believed to be the most accurate statistically. The OGP
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(2006) has computed these data based on submissions from helicopter operators
worldwide. The resulting statistics have provided a reference for the oil industry to
remain on the OGP helicopter safety goal track. The OGP target has been that "the
individual risk per period of flying exposure for an individual flying on OGP-contracted
business should be no greater than on the average global airline" (Stevens & Sheffield,
2006, p. 28).
The 2004 number of offshore helicopter flights associated with all types of
activity (offshore, seismic, geophysical, pipeline, and others) was 2.5 million, and the
number of passengers transported was 8.5 million. A total of 20 helicopter accidents were
reported, with 26 fatalities. These numbers resulted in 2.05 accidents per 100,000 flight
hours or 0.80 per 100,000 flight stages (OGP, 2006). Stevens & Sheffield (2006) noted
that achieving the OGP safety goal could save more than 200 offshore oil and gas
workers' lives during the next 10 years.
The two biggest offshore regions for helicopter operation have been the North Sea
and the Gulf of Mexico. The North Sea helicopter transportation has been required to
serve large offshore platforms located at great distances from shore.
Gulf of Mexico helicopter operations have historically been rather different. The
majority of the offshore installations are located quite close to shore, and many
services are performed using small single engine helicopters, some of which are
not required to be fitted with emergency flotation equipment. (Rowe & Howson,
2005, p. 1)
Another contrast has been that the FAA has permitted exemptions or exceptions to the
flight recorder regulations that allow transport-category rotorcraft, like some helicopters
in operation in the Gulf of Mexico, to operate without flight recorders (NTSB, 2006b).
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Although the Gulf of Mexico's weather climate has been relatively benign, the
requirement to evacuate the platforms in advance of a hurricane, for example, would
result in operations similar to those in the North Sea. Moreover, "with the development of
the Gulf of Mexico's ultra-deep-water fields, the helicopter operations to these new
platforms are becoming more akin to North Sea operations" (Rowe & Howson, 2005, p.
1).
The largest part of North Sea helicopter operations has been represented by the
UKCS with an average of 90,000 flight hours of the total 130,033 hours flown in the
entire North Sea region during 2004. Rowe & Howson (2005) summarized the safety
performance of UKCS and North Sea operations over the years as follows. Since 1976,
12 fatal helicopter accidents associated with UKCS offshore operations have occurred;
118 lives have been lost since then. The North Sea offshore helicopter fleet experienced
no accidents in the last 2 years for which statistics were available (2003 and 2004). The
last fatal accident occurred in 2002 resulting in 11 fatalities. Previously, there had not
been a fatal offshore accident since 1992. In 2004 the 5-year moving average total
accident rate was 0.77 per 100,000 flying hours, and the fatal accident rate was 0.13 per
100,000 flying hours (OGP, 2006; Rowe & Howson, 2005).
Williams (2006) of the HSAC, in line with the Conference philosophy of sharing
information with all operators to provoke safety initiatives, presented a relevant overview
of Gulf of Mexico helicopter operations that was a representative sample of worldwide
operations.
The 2005 Gulf of Mexico oil industry helicopter accident rate per 100,000 flight
hours was 2.05 with a total of 8 accidents (6 single engine, 1 each light and
medium twin) compared to a 22-year annual average accident rate of 1.89. The
fatal accident rate per 100,000 flight hours during 2005 was 0.51 with a total of 2
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fatal accidents (5 fatalities) compared to a 22-year average of 0.74. During 2005,
improper pilot procedures and technical fault each accounted for 3 (32%) or 6 of
the 8 accidents. The additional accidents causes were 1 unknown and 1 related to
fuel quality control. In the last 5 years, there have been 47 accidents of which 15
were fatal (32%), resulting in 34 fatalities and 42 injuries. 23 (49%) of these
accidents were due to pilot procedure related causes, 13 (28%) were due to
technical fault, and the remaining accidents due other mixed factors. For technical
accidents, there were 9 engine related events, 2 tail rotor events, and 2 for other
technical causes. 13 of the 47 accidents (28%) were related to events around the
helideck (5 obstacle strikes, 4 loss of control, 2 passenger control, and 1 each
approach procedure / tie-down removal). The specific leading causes of accidents
in the last 5 years have been: (a) 9 (19%) engine related and 9 loss of control with
3 fatalities in each category (6 total); (b) 4 (9%) controlled flight into terrain or
water - with 7 fatalities, 4 helideck obstacle strikes with 4 fatalities, and 4 fuel
quality control; (c) 3 (6%) loose cargo striking tail rotor; and (d) 3 (6%) unknown
causes with 14 fatalities (1 night with 10 fatalities). Note - Although night flight
accounts for less than 3% of the GoM [Gulf of Mexico] flight hours, in the last
five years, the 3 night accidents accounted for 7% of the total accidents and 32%)
of total fatalities (11 of 34 total). 2 of the 3 events were fatal. fl[ 2-5)
Table 2 has summarized the operational data from the North Sea, the Gulf of
Mexico, and other worldwide-regions offshore helicopter operations. The salient number
of Gulf of Mexico single engine helicopters has been highlighted. Figure 9 has displayed
5-year accident rates for the same 2004 descriptives. It can be noticed that "the Gulf of

Table 2
2004 Worldwide Offshore Helicopter Operational Data Summary, with Number of
Helicopters by Type (Adapted from OGP, 2006)
Single
engine

Light
twin

Medium
twin

Heavy
twin

Total
fleet

Passengers
carried

Hours
flown

Number
of flights

100

1,826,522

130,033

232,104

rr
Mex

387

60

100

14

561

2,329,064

361,514

1,620,621

Other

46

20

300

63

428

4,031,790

361,942

440,152

Total

433

80

431

146

1,089

8,187,376

853,489

2,292,876
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Mexico accident rate has become significantly higher than that in the North Sea, and this
trend is somewhat surprising in view of the generally benign weather environment in the
region" (Rowe & Howson, 2005, p. 1).

• Gulf of Mexic
• Worldwide
• North Sea

100k hours

# Fatal
Accidents per
100k hours

# Fatal per 1M # Accidents per
occupants
100k flights

Figure 9. 2004 5-year Average Offshore Accident Rates (Adapted from OGP, 2006).

Attitudes toward Helicopter Safety
The HAI and the AHS, with a consortium of operators, manufacturers, and
government regulatory agencies, announced the creation of the IHST in 2006. The
commitment of all industry representatives was to work together in the voluntary
Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST)-like environment crafted specifically for the
rotorcraft community to achieve a reduction in the accident rate by 80% in 2016. The
committee considered this goal to be challenging, but achievable (IHST, 2006b).
Shell's helicopter risk-reduction program has also had the goal of reducing the
accident rate of their contracted-helicopter operations by 80% or more. The program has
been named "7 / 7 = 1"; translated to "reduce the current fatal-accident rate for offshore
helicopter operations from just under seven per million flight hours to around one per
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million flight hours" (Stevens & Sheffield, 2006, p. 28). (Additionally, seven key
measures have been advocated for the program.) Globally, the reduction goal has been
consistent with both the OGP and IHST goals; Shell's analysis showed that:
To achieve a fatal-accident rate of one per million flight hours or less, industry
must re-equip with helicopters designed to the latest requirements in Federal
Aviation Regulations (FAR) 27 (for small aircraft) and 29 (for large ones). . . .
Together with the established risk-reduction potential of simulator training,
quality and safety management systems, HUMS [Health Usage and Monitoring
Systems], HOMP, disciplined takeoff and landing profiles and defensive
equipment like EGPWS [Enhanced Ground-Proximity Warning System] and
TCAS [Traffic Alert Collision Avoidance System], our assessment showed that
helicopters designed to the latest standards can indeed achieve the goal of
reducing the fatal-accident rate by 80 percent or more. (Stevens & Sheffield,
2006, p. 30)
The NTSB has recently recommended to the FAA that:
1. All U.S.-registered turbine-powered helicopters certificated to carry at least 6
passengers to be equipped with a Terrain Awareness and Warning System
(TAWS; NTSB, 2006c).
2. All rotorcraft operating under 14 CFR Parts 91 and 135 with a transportcategory certification to be equipped with a cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and
(FDR). Furthermore, "do not permit exemptions or exceptions to the flight
recorder regulations that allow transport-category rotorcraft to operate without
flight recorders, and withdraw the current exemptions and exceptions that
allow transport-category rotorcraft to operate without flight recorders"
(NTSB, 2006b, p. 9).
Before the current, aforementioned initiatives, offshore helicopter stakeholders
had always been challenged to improve safety. The improvement of North Sea offshore
helicopter operational safety has been revealing. The CAA, with the collaboration of

other North Sea industry participants, experienced disappointing safety records for
helicopters in the 1970s and early 1980s. This led to the formation of the Helicopter
Airworthiness Review Panel (HARP). Among this group's 1984 findings were
recommendations for research into helicopter health and usage monitoring,
crashworthiness, and ditching. The HARP Report also called for an investigation of
human factors-related accidents which led to the formation of the Helicopter Human
Factors Working Group. This group reported its findings in 1987, which included
recommendations for research into an additional seven, mainly operational, areas of
concern (Howson, 2005).
In addition to HARP and the human factors group, a major review of offshore
safety and survival was commissioned in 1993 in response to a UK Air Accidents
Investigation Branch (AAIB) recommendation following the fatal accident at the
Cormorant A oil rig in 1992. This study was conducted by the Review of Helicopter
Offshore Safety and Survival working group, which reported its findings in 1995. The
three joint initiatives by the CAA, the AAIB, and the industry formed the basis for the
majority of the offshore helicopter safety research programs (Howson, 2005). The
coherently developed research programs have contributed to remarkably improved safety
in the helicopter operations in the North Sea region.
A review of accidents and their causes from 1976 through 2002 provided solid
evidence of post-1994 improvement. The study analyzed the UKCS accident statistics by
splitting the period 1976 to 2002 into three 9-year periods. A good measure of the level
of improvement during the period 1994 to 2002 was the (highlighted in Table 3)
reduction in the non-fatal accidents rates (both in terms of flying hours and sectors) from
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the previous two periods. This appeared to be largely due to the reduction in the number
of technical failures since 1993. Part of this improvement could "be attributed to the
introduction of Health Usage and Monitoring Systems (HUMS) on UK offshore
helicopters from 1992" (John Burt Associates Limited/Bomel Limited, 2004, p. 24).
Table 3
Fatal and Non-Fatal Reportable Accident Rates in UKCS 1976-2002
Per 100,000 Flying Hours
Per 100,000 Sectors (Flight
Stages)
Non-Fatal
Non-Fatal
Occupant Fatal
Occupant Fatal
Period
Reportable
Reportable
Accident Rate
Accident Rate
Accident Rate
Accident Rate
1976-1984

1.68

2.24

0.81

1.08

1985-1993

6.18

2.19

2.52

0.89

1994-2002

1.34

0.98

0.61

0,44

1976-2002

3.24

1.84

1.44

0.82

Strategies to deal with both technical failures and pilot-related accidents have
emerged. One way in which helicopter technical issues have been addressed has been by
the introduction of HUMS equipment (Hart, 2005). HUMS has comprised a combination
of sensors, data acquisition technology, and software algorithms, both on board and
ground-based. This system has been used to monitor helicopter vibration to help detect
mechanical failures, which can reduce maintenance costs and improve safety (NTSB,
2006b). Alternatively, HOMP, or FOQA for helicopters, was originally tried by the CAA
in 1999 to impact pilot-related accident causes.
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Shell's studies provided an estimated effectiveness of FOQA for helicopters as a
mitigation measure to reduce accident rates. Based on the common causes of helicopter
accidents, the study concluded that FOQA had the potential to prevent about 15-17% of
helicopter accidents (Stevens & Sheffield, 2006). FOQA for helicopters has been "one of
the more exciting recent developments in improving the management of helicopter risk"
(Hart, 2005, p. 5).

The HOMP Trial and Its Two Reports
In 1999, the CAA initiated trials of FOQA for North Sea helicopters, known as
HOMP - the Helicopter Operations Monitoring Programme. The final reports on HOMP
trial were published in 2002 and 2004. The trials involved two different offshore
helicopter operators and two types of helicopters: AS322L Super Puma and Sikorsky
S76. The results were considered successful: "In March 2004, the ICAO Helicopter
Tiltrotor Study Group (HTSG) unanimously agreed to propose to add HOMP to ICAO
Annex 6 Part III as a Recommended Practice for flight data recorder-equipped
helicopters" (CAA, 2004, p. vi).
The HOMP's data had been acquired and transferred; the data were then analyzed
in a manner that paralleled that of a GDRAS processing fixed-wing FOQA data. The data
analysis performed by the HOMP software included event detection and routine flight
data measurements. The CAA (2004) described the HOMP software (depicted in Figure
10, preceding the hypothesis), consisting of three integrated modules, as follows:
1. The Flight Data Traces (FDT) module reads in flight data from the CQAR,
detects pre-[s7c]defined events and extracts a set of flight data measurements.
The events are stored together with their associated flight data and can be
analysed by viewing event traces and flight data simulations (FDS) from
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within the module. Validated events and flight data measurements are
exported to the other two modules. FDT has been designed to be userconfigurable to allow events and measurements to be modified or added
without the involvement of the software provider. This is important for
filtering out any regular nuisance events.
2. The Flight Data Events (FDE) module stores the validated events generated
by FDT which can be collectively analysed to determine trends in their
frequency of occurrence or severity by location, operating base, pilot code,
flight phase etc. Event severity values are allocated in FDT or FDE and, by
performing a trend analysis of cumulative event severities, FDE provides an
effective risk management tool. FDE has an optional link to the BASIS ASR
[British Airways Safety Information System Air Safety Report] module which
allows any air safety report information associated with a flight data event to
be viewed. This enhances the tracking and management of overall safety
performance. Also, individual events stored within FDE can be further
analysed using a facility known as FDV (Flight Data Visualisation). This
enables event traces to be analysed and flight data simulations to be run from
within the FDE module itself
3. The Flight Data Measurements (FDM) module also stores information
generated by FDT but is not event based. This information is the collection of
many flight data measurements for every single flight; e.g. maximum roll
angle, height at gear retraction, estimated wind speed and direction at landing.
Once in FDM this data can be usefully analysed in many different ways (by
location, time period, aircraft registration etc.) to make comparisons and help
to better understand normal operation in relation to problems identified in
FDE. The module is also useftil for determining realistic and effective event
limits for FDT. (Section 1, pp. 2-3)
A set of HOMP flight phases (CAA, 2002) had been established, as follows: (a)
on the ground (prior to takeoff), (b) takeoff, (c) cruise, (d) landing, and (e) on the ground
(after landing). The set of HOMP events and a set of measurements have been described
in Appendixes A and B. Two identical recommendations from the two reports were to:
1. Continue to develop and refine the HOMP events to maximise the safety
benefits of the programme, and optimise the balance between detecting the
widest possible range of operational risks and minimising the nuisance event
rate.
2. Continue to develop and refine the HOMP measurements to maximise their
accuracy in characterising different aspects of the operation and to provide
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further analysis capabilities. (CAA, 2002, Section 11, p. 1; CAA, 2004,
Section 8, p. 1)

Figure 10. The HOMP System (Adapted from CAA, 2004).

The Research Hypothesis
The review of literature and the empirical HOMP studies has led to the hypothesis
that flight phases, events, and measurements of the helicopter FOQA analysis software
can be refined and/or developed to (a) characterize different aspects of helicopter
operations, (b) detect a wider possible range of operational risks, and (c) provide further
analysis capabilities. This working hypothesis has not led to deductive reasoning
invoking null hypothesis testing.

Chapter III
METHODOLOGY
This study was developed during an internship with a FOQA supplier during the
fall of 2005. The highly experienced FOQA vendor had been transferring FOQA knowhow from the field of fixed-wing aircraft to the helicopter environment. The author, a
helicopter pilot with expertise in air naval operations, and possessing limited linear
programming skills, had been involved with FOQA concepts in academe. The partnering
was planned as integral to the internship and provided the foundation for a research plan
with three objectives. The plan was to develop a helicopter FOQA (HFOQA) version,
while defining, programming, and refining the following three elements (project
objectives) of the HFOQA analysis software:
1. Flight phases: The flight phases had to (a) represent the different
characteristics of a helicopter flight, (b) be able to correspond to the actual
flight state of the helicopter, and (c) cover a wider range of flight profiles,
independently of helicopter model capabilities, or its mission.
2. Events: The events had to (a) detect a wider possible range of operational
risks, (b) trigger a minimal number of false exceedances, and (c) allow, if
possible, association between the event detected and the origin or destination
of the flight.
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3. Measurements: The measurements had to provide (a) accurate operational
profiles without the preexamination of events in individual flights and (b) the
maximum number of analysis capabilities.

Research Design
The three aforementioned objectives demanded actions and real world, practiceoriented solutions. Thus, the project became a problem-centered study; "instead of
methods being important, the problem is most important" (Creswell, 2003, p. 5). There
was a concern with application - "what works" (Creswell, p. 5). The use of "pluralistic
approaches to derive knowledge about the problem" (Creswell, p. 6) was the
philosophical underpinning. The three project objectives brought general philosophical
ideas or "knowledge claims" (Creswell, p. 5) of pragmatism, which oriented the research
to the use of a mixed methods framework.

Mixed Methods
Mixed methods could be defined as the research approach that has focused "on
collecting and analyzing both quantitative and qualitative data in a single study . . . to
converge or confirm findings from different data sources" (Creswell, 2003, p. 210).
Because mixed methods research has been relatively new as an individual research
strategy in the social sciences, Creswell encouraged that a basic description be presented.
This author offered a concise report of the method and its evolvement:
Less well known than either the quantitative or qualitative strategies are those that
involve collecting and analyzing both forms of data in a single study. The concept
of mixing different methods probably originated in 1959, when Campbell and
Fiske used multiple methods to study validity of psychological traits. They
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encouraged others to employ their "multimethod matrix" to examine multiple
approaches to data collection in a study. This prompted others to mix methods,
and soon approaches associated with field methods such as observations and
interviews (qualitative data) were combined with traditional surveys (quantitative
data) (S. D. Sieber, 1973). Recognizing that all methods have limitations,
researchers felt that biases inherent in any single method could neutralize or
cancel the biases of other methods. Triangulating data sources - a means for
seeking convergence across qualitative and quantitative methods - were born
(Jick, 1979). From the original concept of triangulation emerged additional
reasons for mixing different types of data. For example, the results from one
method can help develop or inform the other method (Greene, Caracelli, &
Graham, 1989). Alternatively, one method can be nested within another method to
provide insight into different levels or units of analysis (Tashakkori & Teddlie,
1998). . . . These reasons for mixing methods have led writers from around the
world to develop procedures for mixed methods strategies of inquiry and to take
the numerous terms found in the literature, such as multimethod, convergence,
integrated, and combined (Creswell, 1994) and shape procedures for research
(Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003). (pp. 15-16)

Data Collection
The data collection strategy utilized in this mixed methods approach was known
as Concurrent Procedures. The collection of both the qualitative data and the quantitative
data occurred at the same time (concurrently) in the research process. No greater priority
or weight was given to a specific type of data; the qualitative and quantitative information
were equally treated. The two types of data were integrated during the analysis and
interpretation stages of the study; no overall theoretical perspective guided this strategy
(Creswell, 2003).
The data originated from different sources. The qualitative data sources were
represented by a helicopter pilot (the author), FOQA specialists and programmers, and an
offshore helicopter operator chief pilot. The quantitative data sources were helicopter
FDAUs. The selected sources were chosen to concurrently gather subjective data from a
high level of expertise with accurate, objective data to incorporate and cross-validate all
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aspects of HFOQA programming. All data collection was oriented to achieve the real
world solution for the HFOQA development.
The author was the main source of helicopter expertise as well as the computer
programmer. Subjective helicopter expertise was applied throughout the programming
process (e.g., knowledge of how the in-flight helicopter behavior was translated into
parameter indications). Company FOQA specialists and programmers were consulted for
data concepts pertaining to FOQA know-how or programming expertise (i.e., when,
during the programming process, the author was unable to code information into the
HFOQA software programming language). Information from the offshore helicopter
operator's chief pilot encompassed the limit values of parameters, or sensitive issues
regarding established SOPs.
The quantitative data retrieved from helicopter FDAUs were de-identified digital
flight data. This objective information confirmed (corroborating or contradicting) the
linear programming. Extensive reliance upon the digital flight data was employed during
the analysis and interpretation process of the study. A total of 1,014 flights with different
origins and destinations comprised the quantitative data set. Table 4 has displayed an
overview of the research design utilized.

Data Analysis, Interpretation, and Validity
The author was primary trained to work with the HFOQA GDRAS and its
programming language for 2 weeks. This GDRAS has been used by fixed-wing
community with FOQA, included several major U.S. and worldwide airlines; it has been
considered as one of the most capable in terms of functionality and processing (Wu,
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2005). The combination of the GDRAS intuitive interface, together with its practical
environment, allowed the author to gain knowledge of HFOQA programming techniques
in a short amount of time.
Table 4
Research Design (Adaptedfrom Creswell, 2003)
Mixed Methods Framework Elements
1. Knowledge Claims

Pragmatic Assumptions

2. Strategies of Inquiry

Concurrent Procedures

3. Qualitative Data Sources

Helicopter and FOQA Experts

4. Quantitative Data Sources

Flight Data Acquisition Units (FDAUs)

5. Data Priority

Equal

6. Data Integration

At Data Analysis

7. Theoretical Perspective

Implicit

Accordingly, the programming stage of the study was divided into the established
project objectives. The first 4 weeks of the stage were dedicated to work on the definition
of the HFOQA flight phases. Upon completing and validating the definitions of the flight
phases, the next 4 weeks were committed to the creation and refinement of the HFOQA
events. Finally, the last 4 weeks of the study were devoted to the development of
HFOQA measurements and statistical reports. (Table 5 has illustrated the study's overall
timeline.)

Definition of HFOQA Flight Phases
The HFOQA GDRAS contained several modules, including one for event
detection and another for statistical reports. However, before finding events or assessing
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Table 5
HFOQA Study's Overall Timeline

Task

1st Step

2nd Step

3rd Step

1. HFOQA
Programming
Language Training

Duration
2 Weeks

2. Definition of
Flight Phases

Selection of
relevant helicopter
flight segments

Selection of
parameters for
usage in
composing the
program

Programming

4 Weeks

3. Definition of
Events

Selection of
operational events

Selection of
maintenance
events

Programming and
establishment of
severity levels

4 Weeks

4. Definition of
Measurements and
Statistical Reports

Program HFOQA
to store parameters
of all flights in its
maximum, or
minimum
conditions

Creation of safety/
efficiency
operational
procedures;
program HFOQA
to store related
parameter values

Programming of
standard statistical
reports

4 Weeks

operational statistics, the HFOQA GDRAS had to recognize and correctly represent
helicopter flights. The helicopter flight phases programming stage was vital; flight phases
were to provide the logic for the helicopter's flight behavior with respect to its regime
and location for all other HFOQA features and modules. For example, the importance of
well-defined flight phases became decisive during the analysis process of a detected
event in a given location of the helicopter flight path. The occurrence of a specified bank
angle exceedance, whether identified in a cruise flight phase above 500 ft, or during the
takeoff close to the terrain, resulted in totally different concerns and mitigation actions.
The first step of the flight phase definition and programming was to segregate a
typical helicopter flight path into singular and unique pieces/segments; for example, (a)
on the ground, (b) taxiing, (c) hovering, (d) climbing, (e) cruising, and (f) landing. These
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segments had to accurately correspond to significant helicopter flight characteristics
during the period beginning with the preflight (commencing when the aircraft has
initially been electrically powered) through the helicopter "engine shutdown." These
selected pieces of flight became the flight phases to be programmed.
Having chosen the relevant segments of a helicopter flight path (flight phases) to
be programmed, the second step was to comprehend and decide upon the recorded and/or
software-calculated helicopter parameters for usage in composing the program. These
parameters needed to have values that varied remarkably and according to the flight
phase changes. The parameters were to trigger a flight phase start and end in the
programming stage.
The programming stage of the selected helicopter flight phases was the third step.
The HFOQA flight phase programming encompassed assembling the conspicuous
parameters with the flight phase concepts in the HFOQA GDRAS language. Throughout
the process, the digital flight data were used to verify the effectiveness and accuracy of
the computer-generated flight phases. Following the programming stage, validation of the
HFOQA flight phases definition was conducted through peer examination by FOQA
specialists and programmers.

Definition of HFOQA Events
As the 7th week of the study commenced, the definition and programming of
HFOQA events became necessary. The project dictated that both operational and
maintenance risks must be detected by HFOQA. All parameters in a specific flight profile
that could affect flight safety, efficiency, or SOPs needed to be monitored for

exceedances. Consequently, it was decided that three levels of severity would be
established for each of the monitored parameters.
The first step of the events programming was to define the events to be
programmed. For the operational events, the HOMP trial events (Appendix A) were used
as the basis. Events from HOMP were selected that, having been programmed, could
have their effectiveness verified by the available flight data. New operational events,
based on safety, efficiency, and the operator's SOPs, were also established. Definition of
the maintenance events was directed by the helicopter maintenance manual.
The programming process occurred as the second step and concurrently with the
establishment of severity levels for each event. The events were programmed in a manner
to probe deeper than the event detection, thereby allowing for any future correlations
between the detected event and the flight origin or destination, where applicable. Three
severity levels and their respective limits were assigned for each event: level 1 for low
severity, level 2 for medium severity, and level 3 for high severity. The quantitative flight
data were used to verify if events that occurred were actually detected, and if the
established limits for the severity levels were appropriate. Descriptive plots (e.g.,
normality of distribution) of the flight data were also generated as a reasonable check of
the event detections and their assigned limit levels.
The validity check of the events definition was, once again, conducted via peer
examination by FOQA specialists and programmers. The determined event limits for
each severity level were also peer-validated by the aforementioned offshore helicopter
operator's chief pilot. Furthermore, the overall event detection capability was validated
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through generated flight data from a specific real world test flight designed for that
purpose.

Definition of HFOQA Measurements
The GDRAS used in this study allowed both measurements and/or a choice of
statistical analysis procedures. The analysis capabilities permitted the GDRAS to offer
overviews of distinct characteristics of flight operations. Correlations between the
behaviors of different parameters during any desired flight profile, or specific destination
(e.g., absent the preexamination of individual flight events), were possible. Specifically, a
FOQA analyst could view the distribution of maximum speed values as a measure (e.g.,
during the approach flight phase to a given airport) in a plot with outliers and/or other
relevant descriptive statistics (the mean, the standard deviation, etc.). Thus, the core
strategy of this portion of the study was to actualize those statistical analysis capabilities
for helicopter parameters and the created flight phases, while developing standard
statistical reports for the HFOQA GDRAS.
The first step was to program the HFOQA GDRAS to store each operational or
maintenance parameter (pertinent to prior programmed events) for all flights in its
maximum, or minimum, condition. In addition to those event-related measurements, the
second necessary step was to create and program the measurement of specific safety/
efficiency operational procedures as additional, distinct features. For example, a FOQA
analyst would be able to evaluate how much time a helicopter typically endured between
arriving at the offshore rig and completing the landing.
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In completing the HFOQA statistical module, a set of standard statistical reports
was made available to the HFOQA analyst. The programmed set included reports of the
two types of measurements - those related to events and those that were specific safety/
efficiency operational procedures.
The real world flight data were used throughout the programming process to
verify the utility, the functionality, and the concinnity of the statistical reports created.
The validity check of the HFOQA statistical reports was addressed with peer examination
by FOQA specialists and programmers. Some of the created measurements for the safety/
efficiency procedures were validated by real world flight data from the aforementioned
test flight. The results of the methods employed in developing the HFOQA software have
been presented in Chapter IV.

Chapter IV
RESULTS
The working hypothesis that HFOQA analysis software could be refined and/or
developed to (a) characterize different aspects of helicopter operations, (b) detect a wider
possible range of operational risks, and (c) provide further analysis capabilities guided
the methodology. Mixed methods were utilized to combine digital helicopter flight data
with (a) the helicopter expertise of the author, (b) shared FOQA knowledge, (c) one
offshore helicopter operator's SOPs, and (d) aircraft maintenance manual data. The
development of HFOQA analysis software resulted in the emphasis of HFOQA flight
phases, HFOQA events, and HFOQA measurements that promised direct application in
the helicopter industry.

HFOQA Flight Phases
The concept behind the flight phase development was to program HFOQA with
the most extensive spectrum of helicopter flight situations. Consequently, the HFOQA
software was programmed with recognition and representation capabilities that feasibly
encompassed the broadest range of helicopter flight profiles. HFOQA thus precisely
identified and demonstrated what the helicopter was doing at any given moment from the
preflight (commencing when the aircraft has initially been electrically powered) through
the helicopter engine shutdown. A total of 17 flight phases were established and
programmed to accurately cover different helicopter model capabilities and missions.
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Figure 11 has depicted the HFOQA flight phases during a typical helicopter flight
profile. (Differences in flight phases in comparison to the fixed-wing phases of flight
have been illustrated.)

8. Cruise

9. Descent

HFOQA FLIGHT PHASES
10. Final Approach
11. Go Around
6. Takeoff
5. Air Taxi Out
4. Hover Out

17. Engine Stop

Figure 11. HFOQA Flight Phases.

The HFOQA flight phases of Figure 11 have been defined and/or briefly
explained as follows:
1. Preflight - A standby flight phase utilized by the software as a reference that
flight initiation has occurred.
2. Engine Start - At least one engine has experienced rotation.
3. Taxi Out - Helicopter has moved on the ground (on its wheels, if equipped)
before flight.
4. Hover Out - Helicopter has become airborne, with no speed, before flight.
5. Air Taxi Out - Helicopter has become airborne (close to the ground), moving
at a slow speed before flight. This flight phase has been useful to identify the
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taxi of a helicopter with skid/float landing gear and no capability to move on
the surface on its own wheels. The taxi of this aircraft has occurred after the
hover flight phase.
6. Takeoff- The helicopter has departed its origin to accomplish its mission.
7. Climb - Helicopter has ascended from point A enroute to point B.
8. Cruise - Helicopter has achieved level flight during transition from point A
enroute to point B.
9. Descent - Helicopter has left level flight for arrival at point B.
10. Final Approach - Helicopter has commenced preparation for landing.
11. Go Around - Helicopter commenced the final approach; however, for any
unexpected reason, it was obligated to abort the landing, probably in
compliance with emergency procedures.
12. Air Taxi In - Helicopter has completed the arrival, but is in the air (close to
the ground) moving at a slow speed. This flight phase has been necessitated
by the taxi of a helicopter with skid/float landing gear and no capability to
move on the surface on its own wheels.
13. Hover In - Helicopter has remained airborne after arrival, with no speed.
14. Landing - Helicopter touch down following arrival.
15. Touch and Go - After landing, helicopter due to any unexpected reason has
been obligated to takeoff, probably in compliance with emergency procedures.
16. Taxi In - Helicopter has moved on the ground (on its wheels), after flight.
17. Engine Stop - Engines have been shutdown.
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HFOQA Events
The event programming stage utilized the HFOQA automatic event detection
capabilities of the software. A project objective was to detect a wider possible range of
operational risks, while minimizing false exceedances. Furthermore, both operational and
maintenance hazards were to be addressed by the developed HFOQA events.
The study developed 88 HFOQA operational events and 18 maintenance events.
A real world test flight, designed explicitly for the purpose of detection of some of these
operational and maintenance events, was flown. (Appendix C has listed the developed
operational events.) Table 6 has depicted the maintenance event list.
Table 6
HFOQA Maintenance Event List
Maintenance Event Name
1

Single Engine Flight

2

Exhaust Gas Temperature (EGT) Monitoring during Engine Start

3

EGT Monitoring during Takeoff

4

EGT Monitoring during Flight

5

Torque Split

6

Torque Sum of Two Engine Flight

7

Torque Sum of Two Engine Flight above 104%

8

Torque of Single Engine Flight above 127%

9

Torque of Single Engine Flight above 135%

10

Nl of Two Engine Flight above 100%

11

Nl of Single Engine Flight above 101.2%

12

Nl of Single Engine Flight above 104.6%

13

Nl Maximum Continuous

14

Nl Monitoring during Takeoff

15

Nl above of the 2 Minutes Limit

16

Nl above of the 30 Seconds Limit

17

N2 Maximum Exceedance

18

N2 Minimum Exceedance
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Digital flight data were one of the means for verification and validation of the
programming utilized throughout the study. Figure 12, for example, has displayed the use
of objective flight data to verify the accuracy of the event detection and the rationality of
the established severity level limits. The available flight data represented typical flights
(i.e., normal flights with no reported incidents). As such, if the established severity level
limits were sound, the number of levels 2 and 3 events encountered would be smaller
than the number of level 1 events. This rationale was utilized to refine the preliminary
limits (assigned for those monitored parameters in conditions with no required SOP
controls) and prior to the final, decisive word of the offshore helicopter operator's chief
pilot. Figure 12 has depicted a sample of the aforementioned technique applied during a
preliminary stage of the study.
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An example of the use of the quantitative flight data as a validation tool has been
depicted in Figure 13. A real world test flight was designed to explicitly provide
maneuvers that would generate exceedances. Each maneuver duplicated a possible real
flight situation. For example, maneuvers such as (a) go around, (b) split engine torques,
(c) bird strike avoidance maneuver, (d) orbital patterns, and (e) high speed taxi were
included in the test flight. The safety boundaries of the test flight were reviewed and
approved by the operator's flight safety officer. Figure 13 has displayed the test flight
path in a latitude/longitude (de-identified) plot and included the events detected by
HFOQA due to the intentionally induced exceedances.

Figure 13. Event Detection Test Flight.
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HFOQA Measurements
The principal goal of the measurements programming process was to enhance the
previous HFOQA status of exceedance detection software to an operational analysis tool.
The result was that the software's enhanced statistical capabilities allowed broader
analysis studies and overviews of the ongoing helicopter operations without any
preexamination of events in individual flights.
There were two types of measurement in this HFOQA study. The first type of
measurement was related to the operational or maintenance parameters that were already
included in the programmed HFOQA events (see Appendix C and Table 6). Each of
those parameters was programmed to be measured and stored not only when an
exceedance occurred, but also during all flights when any of the following occurred: (a)
the parameter's maximum value, (b) the minimum value, or (c) a specific relevant
condition. Additionally, helicopter altitude and velocity data at the moment of the
registered maximum and minimum values were also recorded.
The second type of measurement created was that associated with other specific
procedures of safety/efficiency interest. Procedures were developed and programmed to
measure and store relevant information (aside from those predetermined maximum or
minimum parameter values of programmed events) of particular safety/efficiency flight
profiles for future operational comparisons or analyses. These measurements were
expatiated to address the operational necessities of the offshore helicopter industry. Table
7 has presented these additional HFOQA measurements.
Following the measurements, the final, standard statistical reports, either with
parameter correlations in the appropriate flight profiles or with the safety/efficiency
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procedures of interest, were developed for the HFOQA statistical report module. Some
examples of these reports have been presented in Figures 14-16.
Table 7
HFOQA Safety/Efficiency Flight Profile Measurements
Name
Definition
i
1

T^ A x n •> r/TNx *ry\
Measure and store flight profile data in each takeoff or
Dead Man s Curve (DMC)
. ,.
,
1 ,^ u r
*
j n ™,n~
landing and compare with the helicopter model s DMC

2

Rig Landing

Measure and store flight profile data during rig landing

3

Orbit Snapshot

Measure and store flight profile data and time if the
helicopter executed more than two orbits before landing

,., , A M
x
Helideck Movement

Measure and store helicopter parameters when landed on
, AJ?
/
wr
*• r
rr,
offshore platform to capture platform movement information.
Measure and store outside air temperature to detect hot gas
flow when landed on the offshore platform

TT

Hot Plume

Figure 14 has displayed a report concerned with the comparison between
helicopter flight profiles and the helicopter's Dead Man's Curve (DMC) during takeoff
from offshore platforms and airport runways. The DMC, or height velocity curve, is a
chart (height on the y-axis and velocity on the x-axis) depicting combinations of airspeed
and altitude that do not provide sufficient stored energy to permit a safe landing of the
helicopter in the event of an engine failure (Cantrell, 2006). The risk exposure (for engine
failure) of helicopters that made takeoffs from airport runways was minimal when
compared to helicopter departures from offshore platforms. (Blue dots represent the
actual helicopter flight profiles and their heights and velocities during takeoff; black dots
represent the DMC.) In theory, helicopters experiencing engine failure inside the curve
composed by black dots would not be able to recover and fly, or safely recover and land.
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Runway Departures

Platform Departures

Height

Height

•—r

Velocity

Velocity

Figure 14. Helicopter Departures and the Dead Man's Curve Report.

Another HFOQA standard report has been presented in Figure 15. The helicopter
flight attitude (when flying below 20 ft of altitude) was monitored. The possibility of tail
strike during operations close to terrain (such as takeoff and landing) was of concern. The
study demonstrated the maximum pitch-up values in blue and the average heights in red.

I Number o) values
r

Figure 15. Maximum Pitch-up below 20 ft versus Height Report.
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Figure 16 has represented a standard report created to allow assessment of route
risk in terms of number of events. The number of events per year for each route flown
(de-identified) has been displayed in a bar graph.

Events per Route per Year

tto
Number of
Events

V\
VA-FA

m

y/^h

uXUUI

I

II

II

\i\

Routes

Figure 16. Number of Events per Route per Year Report.
The result has enabled risk comparison in terms of parameter exceedances for the
routes considered. Interpretation of the results presented throughout Chapter IV has been
discussed in Chapter V.

Chapter V
DISCUSSION
The practical results of this study can be concisely interpreted as the generation of
HFOQA. The partnership comprising the helicopter operator, a FOQA analysis software
vendor, and a representative of academia assembled the necessary requirements, tools,
and research efforts to develop HFOQA.
Addressing the specifics, the HFOQA analysis software was prepared to be used
by the helicopter industry in any of its different types of operations. In fact, the HFOQA
process has already been used in a successful manner by the aforementioned offshore
helicopter operator in its daily operations.
The HFOQA GDRAS was developed from a capable, well recognized, and highly
accepted fixed-wing FOQA GDRAS. Extensive prior fixed-wing experience of the
FOQA vendor was critical to the efficiency and accuracy of the project. The single
helicopter operator presented its needs and a sample of de-identified digital flight data,
thereby providing both the required motivation and the check-and-balance necessary to
achieve the utilitarian, real world solutions.
Ultimately, integration of the industry apparatus and requirements with the
research knowledge and capabilities of the academic representative were vital in
achieving the results of the study. In line with the flow of the software development
process, the chronological interpretations that follow address the three objectives of the
project: HFOQA flight phases, HFOQA events, and HFOQA measurements.
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Interpretation of HFOQA Flight Phases
The diverse helicopter flight attitudes, encountered from the preflight
(commencing when the aircraft has initially been electrically powered) through the
helicopter's engine(s) shutdown, were characterized by relevancy and parsed into flight
phases. Each of the created flight phases (see Figure 11):
1. Had a significant operational meaning.
2. Was considered essential to the understanding of helicopter flight.
3. Provided statistical tracking of events and measurements.
Total reprogramming of the fixed-wing GDRAS used as the basis for the HFOQA
GDRAS was necessary to address the characteristics of helicopter flight. Several
specifics differentiated a helicopter flight profile from a fixed-wing flight profile; for
example, the helicopter's hover capability. Moreover, different models of helicopters
required different manners to achieve distinct flight characteristics. For example, one
helicopter might be able to perform a running takeoff from a runway on its own wheels,
whereas another model of helicopter has needed to assume a hover attitude prior to
takeoff. Thus, Chapter IV's programmed HFOQA flight phases included all types of
helicopters and their capabilities, primarily during the close-to-the-ground flight
maneuvers (e.g., the programmed HFOQA flight phases: [a] Air Taxi Out/In, [b] Go
Around, and [c] Touch and Go need further amplification).
Air Taxi Out/In flight phases were programmed to specifically address the
operation of a helicopter with skids or float landing gear. Taxiing of this type of
helicopter has occurred after the rotorcraft has become airborne, due to the absence of
wheels. Skids have proliferated as landing gear on helicopters. Landing gear consisting of
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the less common floats for helicopters have been employed by those operators that
needed to land on lakes and/or rivers.
The Go Around HFOQA flight phase represented an aborted landing of a
helicopter that had commenced the final approach. The Touch and Go HFOQA flight
phase has occurred when, after landing, the helicopter has been obligated to takeoff
again. These two HFOQA flight phases were programmed to monitor critical, assumed
helicopter flight states during the significant phase of approach for landing.
Usually, the need for a Go Around could be determined by either ATC or the pilot
in command; for example, when an obstructed landing area has presented itself or an
unstabilized approach has occurred. However, in many helicopter operations, landings
have occurred in unfamiliar areas with no ATC services available. Therefore, the decision
to Go Around has become solely the captain's initiative, thereby increasing the risk of the
operation.
The Touch and Go occurrences envisioned during the programming process were,
for example, those related to the pilot's maneuvering to avoid a helicopter ground
resonance phenomenon. The ground resonance phenomenon has developed when the
helicopter rotor blades move out of phase with each other and cause the rotor disc to
become unbalanced. This emergency situation has resulted in the entire hull being ripped
apart by the aircraft's own extreme oscillations, especially when the skids or wheels have
touched the ground lightly. If the pilot has maintained the rotor rpm within the normal
operating range after touchdown, immediate takeoff can restore rotor balance. In other
words, breaking contact with the ground has been the best technique to break free of a
ground resonance incident (Lewis & Darbo, 2006).
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Interpretation of HFOQA Events
The programmed HFOQA events, as introduced in Chapter IV, consisted of
operational and maintenance events. Each HFOQA event was designed with three levels
of severity. A real world test flight was flown to evaluate the software capability to
precisely detect the programmed HFOQA events.
The resultant HFOQA operational events (see Appendix C), when applicable,
were designated with the words DEP (Departure) and ARR (Arrival). The events with the
DEP designation were related to those programmed to detect parameter exceedances
prior to the Cruise phase of flight. Alternatively, the ARR designated events were those
planned to identify parameter exceedances that happened during and after the Cruise
flight phase. Thus, this defined approach to the HFOQA event programming process
allowed the recognition, through trend analysis, of whether a detected event was likely to
be related to some operational characteristic of the flight's origin (detected DEP events)
or the flight's destination (detected ARR events).
The resultant HFOQA maintenance events basically covered the recorded
maintenance parameters available, and their established limits, at the time of the project
development. Beyond the principal function of maintenance anomalies detection,
HFOQA maintenance events were demonstrated as being a powerful tool complementing
the flight operational data during specific incident investigations.
An essential element of the event composition was its severity level. The method
applied (presented in Chapter IV, Figure 12) in verifying the preliminary established
limits was effective. Validation of those limits, provided by the offshore helicopter
operator's chief pilot, resulted in minor refinement.
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The ultimate verification and validation of the HFOQA events detection
capabilities were successfully effected through the real world test flight (see Figure 13).
All assigned exceedances (both operational and maintenance event-related) included in
the test flight were detected, and their levels of severity were correctly identified. In
addition, no falsely detected exceedances were observed.

Interpretation of HFOQA Measurements
The HFOQA GDRAS has automatically stored in its data base several parameter
measurements from all input flight data replayed. The two types of HFOQA
measurements (event-related and safety/efficiency flight profile) introduced in Chapter
IV enhanced the HFOQA software storage of desired data, thereby enabling a vast array
of statistical analysis capabilities. Some statistical analysis procedures, considered to be
of most frequent use, became HFOQA standard statistical reports.
Two results substantiated the establishment of measurements associated with
HFOQA events as a valuable strategy. First, this approach assured that relevant
information was being stored, provided the data comprised parameters generated by prior
recognized risks (events). Second, the adopted measurement strategy was able to
anticipate the actual events. After the event-related measurements programming, the
spectrum of stored parameter data available increased significantly, as did the HFOQA
statistical analysis capability.
Despite the fact that event-related measurements added a significant amount of
data to the HFOQA statistical module, the second type (safety/efficiency flight profile) of
measurements added little data, but the data were operationally-specific. The safety/

efficiency flight profile measurements, depicted in Table 7, were created to address
requests from the offshore helicopter operator. The five measurements listed successfully
addressed critical points of interest for the offshore operation. The measurements were
elaborated to assist in the analysis of issues that have affected offshore helicopter flight
performance on, or around, the offshore platform. For example:
1. The behavior of the helicopter during takeoff and landing, from and onto the
oil rig, were assessed through the DMC and rig landing measurements.
2. The characteristics of the offshore platform in terms of movement (roll, pitch,
and heave), and air temperature were covered by the helideck movement and
hot plume measurements.
3. The in-flight helicopter that has arrived at the oil rig, but has waited for
landing for a certain (unacceptable) amount of time, was addressed through
the programmed orbit snapshot measurement. This measurement has been
salient, because it has allowed observance of any unnecessary helicopter risk
exposure. (In the event of a critical component failure, the helicopter's only
other option for landing would be the sea.)
Chapter IV provided a comprehensive treatment of the HFOQA standard
statistical reports. The chapters that follow (VI and VII) have respectively been devoted
to the conclusions and recommendations of this HFOQA study.

Chapter VI
CONCLUSIONS
The HFOQA study commenced with a comprehensive literature review from
which stemmed the research hypothesis. The foci of the literature reviewed were the
safety aspects of the two subjects of concern, FOQA and the helicopter industry - plus
the combination of them as empirically studied in the HOMP trials. The resultant guiding
research hypothesis was that the refinement and/or development of flight phases, events,
and measurements of the HFOQA analysis software were feasible (refer to Chapter II for
the complete hypothesis statement). Thus, the study concludes with a synthesis of the
interrelated findings for FOQA, helicopters, and the developed HFOQA, having utilized
the relevant literature and the derived research hypothesis as the framework.
The incorporation of the FOQA concept, which can be viewed as an independent
variable for this study, into the helicopter industry (as a dependent variable) has been
demonstrated as both feasible and valuable for the improvement of aviation safety. The
literature revealed that FOQA has become an indispensable element within the SMS of
many airlines. Major airlines of the world have used FOQA data since the 1960s. The
cyclic nature of the FOQA process has included flight data acquisition, followed by
analysis and utilization thereof. The quantitative information provided by FOQA has the
stamp of objectivity. FOQA data have disclosed to the aviation industry what has actually
occurred during flight operations. Consequently, flight safety benefits and operational
cost savings have been realized.
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The helicopter industry has not experienced the safety improvements/records of
the airline industry. Although helicopters participate in many highly-relevant aviation
activities in our society, the helicopter accident rate has been acknowledged as excessive.
Consequently, the stakeholders have decided to drive attitudes and implement safety
innovations that aim to reduce the helicopter accident rate by 80% by 2016. The North
Sea offshore helicopter industry, for example, has considerably reduced its accident rate
during the years through investment in applied research projects. One of these initiatives
has been the implementation of FOQA for helicopters, which has estimates of a 15-17%
reduction in helicopter accidents.
The HOMP trials were the first applications of FOQA concepts to helicopter
operations. The real world trials were located in the North Sea and were sponsored by the
UK CAA and other stakeholders. The successful outcomes of HOMP translated to the
UKOOA members' commitment of HOMP implementation on all FDR-equipped UK
public transport helicopters over the UK Continental Shelf.
This study's methodology (and the resultant product) comprised development of a
helicopter version of FOQA analysis software - labeled HFOQA, with direct application
to the helicopter industry. Mixed methods were designed to combine qualitative data
from helicopter and FOQA experts with quantitative data represented by a sample of deidentified digital flight data. In compliance with the working hypothesis, flight phases,
events, and measurements were the three domains of interest during the development of
the HFOQA software.
The developed HFOQA analysis software can identify 17 different flight phases
of a typical helicopter flight profile. These flight phases characterize diverse helicopter

flight attitudes, and meet different helicopter model capabilities and missions. This
programmed flexibility enables the use of the HFOQA software as an effective safety
tool by operators of all types of operations within the helicopter community with no
programming changes of the flight phases.
The developed HFOQA events detect a broad range of maintenance and
operational risks, as well as assign severity levels. Probing deeper than event detection,
the combination of maintenance and operational data strengthens HFOQA analysis
capabilities in the investigation of specific incidents. Additionally, applicable correlations
can be obtained between the detected event and the flight origin or destination.
Recorded measurements, from all input flight data replayed, enhance the HFOQA
GDRAS storage of data and provide broad statistical analysis capabilities. There are two
types of HFOQA measurements: event-related measurements and safety/efficiency flight
profile measurements. Overviews of helicopter operations, absent the preexamination of
events, are possible. HFOQA standard statistical reports are available for the frequently
utilized analyses.
This HFOQA software development, resulting from an industry-academia
partnership, has resulted in acceptance of the working research hypothesis. This study
also concludes that HFOQA 7s contribution to the consolidation and expansion of FOQA
concepts throughout the helicopter environment (in demand by the aviation industry) has
been successfully achieved.

Chapter VII
RECOMMENDATIONS
The worldwide helicopter industry is currently experiencing a favorable economic
period. However, helicopter operations suffer from a considerably higher accident rate
than that reported by (mostly non-profitable) major airlines. A hidden lining is that the
helicopter manufacturers, the operators, the customer organizations, and the regulators
have acknowledged, and commenced work, on the necessity for safer operations.
The North Sea's offshore oil exploration stakeholders have set a realistic example
for the entire industry. Since the 1990s, significant safety improvements have been
achieved in that geo-region. Industry partnerships involving investment in applied
research have generated effective tools to reduce the number of accidents. The outcome
of FOQA for helicopters is one of these tools; it has the potential to enhance the safety
and the quality of flight operations.
This HFOQA study addressed the development and refinement of flight phases,
events, and measurements for the HFOQA analysis software. A FOQA vendor, an
offshore helicopter operator, and a representative of academe comprised the partnership
that was essential to the success of the HFOQA software development. Group dynamics
and understanding provided the motivation and structure for the study. The partnership's
composition naturally resulted in accentuated advances in HFOQA features specific to
the offshore industry (e.g., the developed safety/efficiency flight profile measurements
addressed offshore platform issues). Notwithstanding the involvement of only an offshore
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operator, the HFOQA software was designed to be utilized by the helicopter community
in its entirety.
Therefore, the following suggestions are recommended for future studies:
1. Assemble partnerships among helicopter operators, FOQA analysis software
vendors, and academe to aggregate the industry experience and knowledge,
the apparatus, and the scientific research familiarity in effecting new HFOQA
analysis capabilities.
2. Assemble partnerships with helicopter operators involved with different
missions (e.g., EMS, sightseeing, military, and others) to assess the necessities
of the diverse helicopter community for the development of new HFOQA
analysis tools.
3. Develop new safety/efficiency flight profile measurements to meet other
offshore helicopter operation demands (e.g., pilot workload).
4. Develop new measurements, both event-related and safety/efficiency flight
profile, for other facets of the helicopter community.
5. Develop additional standard statistical reports that are readily available to the
HFOQA analyst.
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Event
Number

Title

Applicable
Condition

Trigger Parameters

Rationale

01A

High Pitch-Up Attitude
Below 20 ft AGL

Air

Pi ten Attitude Radio
Altitude

To detect the risk of a tail rotor strike.

01B

High Pitch-Up Attitude
Above 20 ft and Below 500
ft AGL

Air

Pitch Attitude, Radio
Altitude

To detect excessive flare angle i e. rushed final approach, likely to
alarm passengers or cause crew to lose visual reference.

01C

High Pitch-Up Attitude
Above 500 ft AGL

Air

Pitch Attitude, Radio
Altitude

To detect excessive pitch up attitude in flight

01D

High Pitch-Up Attitude
Below 90 knots IAS

Air

Pitch Attitude, Indicated
Airspeed

To detect excessive pitch up attitude at lower speeds.

01E

High Pitch-Up Attitude
Above 90 knots IAS

Air

Pitch Attitude Indicated
Airspeed

To detect excessive pitch up attitude at higher speeds.

02.A

High Pitch-Down Attitude
Below 20 ft AGL

Air

Pitch Attitude, Radio
Altitude

To detect excessive nose down pitch attitude during take-off
transition which might result in striking the ground if an engine
failed

02 B

High Pitch-Down Attitude
Above 20 ft and Below 50O
ft AGL

Air

Pitch Attitude, Radio
Altitude

To detect excessive nose down pitch attitude during take-off
transition and at other lower level flight conditions.

02C

High Pitch-Down Attitude
Above 500 ft AGL

Air

Pitch Attitude, Radio
Altitude

To detect excessive pitch down attitude in flight.

02 D

High Pitch-Down Attitude
Below 90 knots IAS

Air

Pitch Attitude Indicated
Airspeed

To detect excessive pitch down attitude at lower speeds.

02E

High Pitch-Down Attitude
Above 90 knots IAS

Air

Pitch Attitude Indicated
Airspeed

To detect excessive pitch down attitude at higher speeds.

Event
Number

Title

Applicable
Condition

Trigger Parameters

Rationale

03A

High Pitch Rate Below 500
ft AGL

Air

Pitch Rate, Radio Altitude

To detect excessive rate of change of pitch attitude at lower level
flight conditions.

03B

High Pitch Rate Above 500
ft AGL

Air

Pitch Rate, Radio Altitude

To detect excessive rate of change of pitch attitude in flight.

04A

Low Maximum Pitch Rate
on Rig Take-Off

Rig Take-Off

Pitch Rate

To detect a low helicopter rotation rate during rotation on a take-off
from a helideck which could result in a deck strike if an engine
failed.

04B

High Maximum Pitch Rate
on Rig Take-Off

Rig Take-Off

Pitch Rate

To detect a high helicopter rotation rate dunng rotation on a takeoff from a helideck. which might cause crew disorientation and
passenger alarm.

05A

Low Maximum Pitch-Do wri
Attitude on Rig Take-Off

Rig Take-Off

Pitch Attitude

To detect a low nose down pitch attitude dunng rotation on a takeoff from a helideck, which could result in a deck strike if an engine
failed.

05B

High Maximum Pitch-Down
Attitude on Rig Take-Off

Rig Take-Off

Pitch Attitude

To detect a high nose down pitch attitude during rotation on a takeoff from a helideck, which might cause crew disorientation and
passenger alarm.

06A

Roll Attitude Above 30 deg
Below 300 ft AGL

Air

Roll Attitude, Radio Altitude

To detect exceedance of the Flight Manual roll attitude limit for
weights above 18 410 lb at lower level flight conditions.

06 B

Roll Attitude Above 40 deg
Below 300 ft AGL

Air

Roll Attitude, Radio Altitude

To detect exceedance of the Flight Manual roll attitude limit for
weights above 17,200 lb at lower level flight conditions.

06C

Roll Attitude Above 30 deg
Above 300 ft AGL

Air

Roll Attitude, Radio AJtitude

To detect exceedance of the Flight Manual roll attitude limit for
weights above 18,410 lb

06D

Roll Attitude Above 40 deg
Above 300 ft AGL

Air

Roll Attitude, Radio AJtitude

To detect exceedance of the Flight Manual roll attitude limit for
weights above 17.200 lb.

07A

High Roll Rate Below 500 ft
AGL

Air

Roll Rate, Radio Altitude

To detect excessive roll rate at lower level flight conditions.
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Event
Number

Tide

Applicable
Condition

Trigger Parameters

Rationale

07B

High Roll Rate Above 500 ft
AGL

Air

Roll Rate Radio Altitude

To detect excessive roll rate in flight.

08A

High Rate of Descent
Below 500 ft AGL

Air

Rate of Descent, Radio
Altitude

To detect an excessive rate of descent at low height.

08 B

High Rate of Descent
Above 500 ft AGL

Air

Rate of Descent Radio
Altitude

To detect an excessive rate of descent.

08 C

High Rate of Descent
Below 30 knots LAS

Air

Rate of Descent, Indicated
Airspeed

To detect an excessive rate of descent at low airspeed (where
there is danger of entering the vortex ring state).

09A

Low Airspeed Above 500 ft
AGL

Take-Off
Cruise

Indicated Airspeed

To detect flight at an unusually low airspeed.

10A

Normal Acceleration Above
500 ft .AGL

Air

Normal Acceleration, Radio
Altitude

To detect a high normal acceleration in flight due to tuibulence or a
manoeuvre.

10B

Normal Acceleration Below
500 ft AGL

Air

Normal Acceleration, Radio
Altitude

To detect a high normal acceleration at lower level flight conditions
due to turbulence or a manoeuvre.

10C

Lateral Acceleration Above
500 ft AGL

Air

Lateral Acceleration, Radio
Altitude

To detect a high lateral acceleration in flight due to turbulence or a
manoeuvre.

10D

Lateral Acceleration Below
500 ft AGL

Air

Lateral Acceleration, Radio
Altitude

To detect a high lateral acceleration at tower level flight conditions
due to turbulence or a manoeuvre.

10E

Longitudinal Acceleration
Above 500 ft AGL

Air

Longitudinal Acceleration,
Radio Altitude

To detect a high longitudinal acceleration in flight due to turbulence
or a manoeuvre.

10F

Longitudinal Acceleration
Below 500 ft AGL

Air

Longitudinal Acceleration,
Radio Altitude

To detect a high longitudinal acceleration at lower level flight
conditions due to turbulence or a manoeuvre.

11A

Excessive Lateral Cyclic
Control

Air

Lateral Cyclic Pitch

To detect movement of the lateral cyclic control to extreme left or
right positions.

Applicable
Condition

Trigg er Para rn et ers

Event
Number

Title

Rationale

11B/C

Excessive Longitudinal
Cyclic Control

Air

Longitudinal Cyclic Pitch

To detect movement of the longitudinal cyclic control to extreme
forward or aft positions.

12A

Excessive Collective Pitch
Control in Level Flight

Air

Collective Pitch. Rate of
Descent

To detect approaches to, or exceedances of. Flight Manual
collective pitch limits for cruising flight.

12B

Excessrve Collective Pitch
Control

Air

Collective Pitch

To detect exceedances of the absolute maximum Flight Manual
collective pitch limit

13A

Pilot Event Marker Pressed

Air

14A

IAS Mode Engaged Below
60 knot3 IAS

Air

Autopilot IAS Mode
Indicated Airspeed

To detect inappropriate engagement of autopilot airspeed hold at
low airspeeds

14B

ALT Mode Engaged Below
60 knots IAS

Air

Autopilot ALT Mode,
Indicated Airspeed

To detect inappropriate engagement of autopilot altitude hold at
low airspeeds.

14C

HDG Mode Engaged Below
60 knots IAS.

Air

Autopilot HDG Mode,
Indicated Airspeed

To detect inappropriate engagement of auto pi lot heading hold at
low airspeeds.

15A

Gear Selected Up Below
100 ft AGL on Take-off

Take-Off

Gear Select Radio AJtitude

To detect early retraction of the landing gear during take-off.

15B

Gear Not Selected Down
Below 300 ft AGL on
Landing

Landing

Gear Select, Radio .Altitude

To detect late lowering of the landing gear during landing.

16A

Excessrve Time in Avoid
Area

17A/C

VNO Exceedance

Air

VNO, Weight

To detect exceedance of the Flight Manual VNO limit (this is
weight dependent).

17B/D

VNE Exceedance

Air

VNE, Weight

To detect exceedance of the Flight Manual VNE limit (this is weight
dependent).

To detect when the FDR pilot event marker has been pressed-

Not yet implemented (awaiting low airspeed algorithm).

Event
Number

Title

Applicable
Condition

Trigger P a r a m e t e r s

Rationale

ISA

N o . 1 (LH) Fuel C o n t e n t s
Low

Air

LH Fuel Contents

To detect if t h e total remaining fuel c o n t e n t s fall b e l o w t h e

18B

N o . 2 (RH) Fuel C o n t e n t s
Low

Air

RH Fuel C o n t e n t s

To d e t e c t if t h e total remaining fuel c o n t e n t s fall b e l o w t h e

ISA

Heater O n D u r i n g Take-Off

Take-Off

Heater

To detect n o n - c o n f o n n a n c e w i t h t h e Flight M a n u a l r e q u i r e m e n t

19B

Heater O n During Landing

Landing

Heater

To detect non-conformance w i t h t h e R i g h t M a n u a l r e q u i r e m e n t
that t h e cabin heater should b e off d u n n g landing.

20A

Early Turn o n O f f s h o r e
Take-Off at N i g h t

Rig Take-Off

Heading. Ground Speed

To detect an early turn after an o f f s h o r e take-off at night.

21A

High G r o u n d S p e e d W i t h i n
2 0 s e c o n d s of Rig Landing

Rig Landing

Ground Speed

To d e t e c t a high g r o u n d speed on t h e final approach t o a helideck
landing.

21 B

High G r o u n d S p e e d W i t h i n
10 s e c o n d s of A i r p o r t
Landing

Airport
Landing

Ground Speed

To d e t e c t a high ground speed on t h e final approach t o an airport
landing.

22A

High A i r s p e e d B e l o w 100 ft
AGL

Air

Indicated A i r s p e e d , Radio
Altitude

To d e t e c t high s p e e d flight at l o w level.

22B

High A i r s p e e d Below 100 ft
A G L and Gear Up

Air

Indicated A i r s p e e d , Radio
Altitude Gear Select

To detect high s p e e d flight 8t l o w level w i t h t h e landing gear
retracted.

23A

D o w n w i n d Flight W i t h i n 6 0
s e c o n d s of Take-Off

Take-Off

Indicated Airspeed, Ground
Speed

To detect d o w n w i n d flight shortly after take-off.

23B

D o w n w i n d Flight W i t h i n 6 0
s e c o n d s of Landing

Landing

Indicated Airspeed, Ground
Speed

To d e t e c t d o w n w i n d flight shortly before landing.

24A

L o w Rotor S p e e d - Power
On

Air

Rotor Speed, Total Torque

To d e t e c t excessively tew rotor s p e e d during p o w e r - o n flight.

Applicable
Condition

Trigger P a r a m e t e r s

High Rotor S p e e d - Power
On

Air

Rotor Speed, Total Torque

To detect excessively high rotor s p e e d during power-on flight.

L o w Rotor S p e e d - Power

Air

Rotor Speed Total Torque

To d e t e c t exceedance of t h e Flight M a n u a l m i n i m u m rotor s p e e d
limit for power-off flight.

Air

Rotor Speed, Total Torque

To d e t e c t exceedance of t h e Flight M a n u a l m a x i m u m rotor speed

Operations M a n u a l limit

Operations M a n u a l limit.

that t h e cabin heater should b e off d u r i n g take-off,

Event
Number
248

24C

Title

Off
24D

High Rotor S p e e d - Power

Rationale

limit for power-off flight.

Off
25A

M a x i m u m Continuous
Torque (2 Engines)

Air

Total Torque

To d e t e c t m o r e than 5 m i n u t e s use of t h e Flight M a n u a l take-off

25 B

M a x i m u m Take-Off Torque

Air

Total Torque

To d e t e c t exceedance of t h e Flight M a n u a l absolute m a x i m u m

26A

Pilot Workload/Turbulence

Landing

Changes in Collective P i t d i

27A

Pilot W o r k l o a d

Landing

Collective, Lateral &
Longitudinal Cyclic

Not yet i m p l e m e n t e d (awaiting o u t c o m e of CAA research project).

28A

Flight T h o u g h H o t Gas

Take-Off.

rating t o r q u e limit

t o r q u e limit.

(2 Engines)

To d e t e c t t u r b u l e n c e e n c o u n t e r e d d u r i n g the final approach t o a
helideck landing.

29A

High Pitch-Up A t t i t u d e o n

O u t s i d e Air Temperature

To d e t e c t if t h e aircraft flies t h r o u g h t h e turbine efflux or flare

Landing

p l u m e d u n n g a helideck take-off or landing.

Ground

Pitch A t t i t u d e

To d e t e c t high aircraft pitch angles w h e n on a vessel's helideck, or
o n sloping g r o u n d .

Ground
29B

30A

High Pitch-Down A t t i t u d e
on Ground

Ground

Pitch A t t i t u d e

To detect high aircraft pitch angles w h e n on a vessel's helideck, or
o n sloping g r o u n d .

H i g h Roll A t t i t u d e o n

Ground

Roll Attitude

To d e t e c t high aircraft roll angles during taxiing, w h e n on a v e s s e l s

High N o r m a l A c c e l e r a t i o n

Landing,

Normal Acceleration

To d e t e c t a heavy landing.

a t Landing

Ground

helideck, or on sloping g r o u n d .

Ground
31A
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Event
Number

Title

Applicable
Condition

Trigger Parameters

Rationale

32A

High Rotor Speed on
Ground

Ground

Rotor Speed

To detect possible governor problems on the ground.

33A

Rotor Brake Applied at
Greater Than 122 Rotor
RPM

Ground

Rotor Brake, Rotor Speed

To detect application of the rotor brake above the Flight Manual
limit for rotor speed.

34A

Excessive Long Cyclic
Control with Insufficient
Collective Pitch on Ground

Ground

Collective Pitch,
Longitudinal Cyclic Pitch

To detect incorrect taxi technique likely to cause rotor head
damage

34B

Excessive Rate of
Movement of Longitudinal
Cyclic on Ground

Ground

Longitudinal Cyclic Pitch
Rate, Rotor Speed

To detect an excessive rate of movement of the longitudinal cyclic
control when on the ground with rotors running.

34 C

Excess rve Rate of
Movement of Lateral Cyclic
on Ground

Ground

Lateral Cyclic Pitch Rate,
Rotor Speed

To detect an excessive rate of movement of the lateral cyclic
control when on the ground with rotors running.

35A'B

Excessive Movement of
Deck

Helideck

Motion Seventy Index

To detect excessive movement of a vessel's helideck when the
helicopter is on the deck-

36 A

High Lateral Acceleration
i rap id comeringl

Ground

Lateral Acceleration

To detect excessive cornenng accelerations/speeds when taxiing.

36B

High Longitudinal
Acceleration i rap id braking)

Ground

Longitudinal Acceleration

To detect excessive deceleration due to braking when taxiing.

37A

High Ground Speed

Ground

Ground Speed

To detect excessive taxiing speeds.

38A

Taxi Limit ileft gear lifts)

Ground

Lateral Cyclic Pitch, Tail
Rotor Pedal

To detect the risk of an aircraft roll over due to incorrect tail rotor
pedal and lateral cyclic control positions when taxiing.

38B

Taxi Limit iright gear lifts)

Ground

Lateral Cyclic Pitch, Tail
Rotor Pedal

To detect the risk of an aircraft roll over due to incorrect tail rotor
pedal and lateral cyclic control positions when taxiing.

Event
Number

Thie

Applicable
Condition

Rationale

Trigger Parameters;

3SA

Single Engined flight

Air

No 1 Eng Tongue, No 2 Eng
Torque

To detect single engined flight.

40A

Torque Split in the Cruise

Cruise

No 1 Eng Torque, No 2 Eng
Torque

To detect a possible engine problem, subsequently found to have
been caused by module 2 stator vane rotation.

41A

•Go Around

Cruise,
Landing

Gear Select

To detect a go-around.

41B

Below Minimum Height on
Go Around

Cruise.
Landing

Gear Select, Radio AJtitude

To detect a descent below the minimum height limit during a go
around.

41C

Below Minimum Height on
•Go Around at Night

Cnjise,
Landing

Gear Select, Radio Altitude

To detect a descent below the minimum height limit during a go
around at night.

42A

Autopilot Engaged On
Ground Before Take-Off

Ground

Autopilot Status

To detect premature engagement of the autopilot prior to take-off
which could result in unexpected control movements.

42 B

Autopilot Engaged On
Ground After Landing

Ground

Autopilot Status

To detect failure to disengage the autopilot after landing which
could result in unexpected control movements.
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APPENDIX B
HOMP Trial Measurement List

82
Measurement

Applicable Condition

Values

Pitch below 20ft AGL

Air

Max +ve, M m - v e

Pitch b e t w e e n 20ft and 500ft AGL

Air

Max +ve. M m - v e

Pitch above 500ft AGL

Ajr

Ma> +ve

Pitch below 90kts IAS

Air

Max +ve, M m

Pitch above 90kts IAS

Air

Man +ve, M i n ^ v e

Pitch rate b e l o w BOOft AGL

Air

Max absolute

Pitch rate above BOOft A 3 L

Air

May absolute

Roll below 300ft AGL

Air

Max absolute

Roll above 300ft AGL

Air

Max absolute

Roll rate below 500ft AGL

Air

Max absolute

Roll rate above 500ft AGL

Air

Max absolute

Yaw rate

Air

Max +ve. M m - v e

Rate of Descent below 50Oft AGL

Air ilndrvidual phases'

Max

Rate of Descent above BOOft AGL

Air ilndrvidual phasesi

Max

Rate of Descent below 30kts IAS

Air (Individual phasesi

Ma>

IAS above BOOft AGL

Air

Mm

Lateral acceleration above BOOft AGL

Air

Max absolute

Lateral acceleration below BOOft AGL

Air

Max absolute

Longitudinal acceleration above BOOft AGL

Air

Ma> absolute

Measurement

Applicable Condition

Values

Longitudinal acceleration below 500ft AGL

Air

Max absolute

Min-^e

Normal acceleration above 500ft AGL

Air

Max absolute

Normal acceleration below BOOft AGL

Air

Max absolute

Lateral cyclic control

Air

M a x , Mm

Longitudinal cyclic control

Ajr

Max, Mm

Collect rve pitch control

Air (Individual phases/

Ma>

IAS at which IAS mode engaged
IAS at which ALT mode engaged
IAS at which HDG mode engaged

Air

Mm
Mm
Mm

IAS

Air

Max

IAS below 100ft AGL

Air

Ma>

Main rotor speed above 10% total torque

Air

Max

Mm

Main rotor speed below 1 0 % total torque

Air

Ma>, Mm

Total torque

Air (Individual phases)

Max

Increase in OAT

Air

Max

Ng engine 1

A i r ilndrvidual phases)

Max

Ng engine 2

Air (Individual phases)

Max

Engine gas temperature engine 1

A i r (Individual phases,'

Max

Engine gas temperature engine 2

Air (Individual phases/

Ma>

Ice detector

Air

Max

IGB oil temperature

Air

Ma>

-VAS
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Measurement

Applicable Condition

Values

MGB oil pressure

Air

Max,. Mm

MGB oil temperature

Air

Max

TGB oil temperature

Air

Max

Pressure altitude

Air

Max

Pilot workload/turbulence (collective only)

Air

Max

Pitdi

Ground

Ma> Mm

Roll

Ground

Max absolute

Main rotor speed

Ground

Max

Longitudinal cyclic control

Ground

Max

Longitudinal cyclic control rate

Ground

Max absolute

Lateral cyclic control rate

Ground

Max absolute

Motion Severity lnde\ lexcluding airports''

Ground

Max

Lateral acceleration

Ground

Max absolute

Longitudinal acceleration

Ground

Max absolute

Ground speed

Ground

Max

NMLA datum value

When calculated

Value

Fuel contents tank 1

At takeoff

Value

Fuel contents tank 2

At take-off

Value

Fuel remaining tank 1

At landing

Value

Fuel remaining tank 2

At landing

Value

Measurement

Applicable Condition

Values

Ajrcraft weight

At takeoff

Value

Aircraft weight

At landing

Value

Rad alt at gear selected up

At gear up

Value

Rad aft at gear selected down

At gear down

Value

Normal acceleration at landing

At landing

Max

MR speed at application of rotor brake

MR brake applied

Value

Engine gas temperature engine 1

At engine start

Max

Engine gas temperature, engine 2

At engine start

Max

Pitch rate, ng take-off

At rotation point

Max

Pitch rig take-off

At rotation point

Max

Rad alt, rig take-off

At max pitch rate

Value

Ground speed, rig landing

Point before landing

Value

Ground speed, airport landing

Point before landing

Value

Pressure altitude

At takeoff

Value

Pressure altitude

At landing

Value

OAT

At takeoff

Value

OAT

At landing

Value

Average wind speed

Point after TO & before LDG

Value

Average wind direction

Point after TO & before LDG

Value

84
Measurement Point

Measurements

Comments
RIG TAKE-OFF PROFILE

1 Liftoff

Take-off reference point

Time, Pressure Altitude, Latitude, Longitude

2 Rotation - Maximum Pitdi Rate

Usually coincides with start of rotation

3 Rotation - Maximum Pitch Down Angle

Usually coincides with end of rotation

4 35. knots Airspeed

Lift-off point if airspeed greater than 35 kts
at lift-off

Time from TakeOff, Radio Altitude Pressure Altitude
CAAU, Pitch. Roll, Heading, Airspeed Groundspeed,
Latitude (N/S distance from take-off) Longitude (W/E
distance from take-offJ

E VyvClimb Speed i

Obtained from Flight Manual

6 Gear Selected Up

End of take-off phase if gear not retracted
by then

7 200 RVet AAL

Definition of climb out path

8 500 Feet AAL

Definition of climb out path

9 1 000 Feet AAL

Definition of climb out path
RIG LANDING PROFILE

l Touch-down

Landing reference point

Time, Pressure Altitude Latitude Longitude

2 35 knots Airspeed

Start of low airspeed phase

3 Gear Selected Down

Start of landing phase if gear already down
b v then

Time to Landing, Radio Altitude, Pressure Altitude
(AAU, Pitch. Roll Heading Airspeed Groundspeed,
Latitude <N/S distance from landing,', Longitude (W/E
distance from landingi

4 1 000 Feet AAL

Definition of approach path

5 500 Feet AAL

Definition of approach path

6 200 Feet AAL

Definition of approach path

7 Maximum Pilot Workload

Workload based on collective onfy
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APPENDIX C
HFOQA Operational Event List

86
Operational Event Name
1

PITCH UP below 20ft - Departure (DEP)

2

PITCH UP between 20ft and 500ft - DEP

3

PITCH UP above 500ft

4

PITCH UP below 90kt Indicated Air Speed (IAS) - DEP

5

PITCH UP above 90kt IAS

6

PITCH UP on the Ground - DEP

7

PITCH UP below 20ft - Arrival (ARR)

8

PITCH UP between 20ft and 500ft - ARR

9

PITCH UP below 90kt - ARR

10

PITCH DOWN below 20ft - DEP

11

PITCH DOWN between 20ft and 500ft - DEP

12

PITCH DOWN above 500ft

13

PITCH DOWN below 90kt IAS - DEP

14

PITCH DOWN above 90kt IAS - DEP

15

PITCH DOWN on the Ground - DEP

16

PITCH DOWN below 20ft - Arrival (ARR)

17

PITCH DOWN between 20ft and 500ft - ARR

18

PITCH DOWN below 90kt - ARR

19

High Maximum PITCH DOWN on Rig Take off

20

Low Maximum PITCH DOWN on Rig Take off

21

PITCH DOWN below 20ft - ARR

22

PITCH DOWN between 20ft and 500ft - ARR

23

PITCH DOWN below 90kt IAS - ARR

24

PITCH DOWN above 90kt IAS - ARR

25

PITCH DOWN on the Ground - ARR

26

PITCH RATE on the Ground - DEP

27

High Maximum PITCH RATE on Rig Take off

28

Low Maximum PITCH RATE on Rig Take off

87
Operational Event Name
29

PITCH RATE above 500ft

30

PITCH RATE below 500ft - DEP

31

PITCH RATE on the Ground - ARR

32

PITCH RATE below 500ft - ARR

33

ROLL below 300ft - DEP

34

ROLL above 300ft

35

ROLL on the Ground - DEP

36

ROLL below 300ft - ARR

37

ROLL on the Ground - ARR

38

ROLL RATE below 500ft - DEP

39

ROLL RATE above 500ft

40

ROLL RATE on the Ground - DEP

41

ROLL RATE below 500ft - ARR

42

ROLL RATE on the Ground - ARR

43

ROLL CYCLIC CONTROL - DEP

44

ROLL CYCLIC CONTROL - ARR

45

ROLL CYCLIC CONTROL on the Ground - DEP

46

ROLL CYCLIC CONTROL on the Ground - ARR

47

PITCH CYCLIC CONTROL - DEP

48

PITCH CYCLIC CONTROL - ARR

49

PITCH CYCLIC CONTROL on the Ground - DEP

50

PITCH CYCLIC CONTROL on the Ground - ARR

51

RATE OF DESCENT above 500ft

52

RATE OF DESCENT below 500ft

53

RATE OF DESCENT below 30kt - DEP

54

RATE OF DESCENT below 30kt - ARR

55

Low IAS above 500ft

56

High IAS below 100ft - DEP

88
Operational Event Name
57

High IAS below 100ft and GEAR UP - DEP

58

High I AS below 100ft - ARR

59

High IAS below 100ft and GEAR UP - ARR

60

High IAS and GEAR DOWN - DEP

61

High IAS and GEAR DOWN - ARR

62

VERTICAL ACCELERATION above 500ft

63

VERTICAL ACCELERATION below 500ft

64

VERTICAL ACCELERATION on Landing

65

LATERAL ACCELERATION above 500ft

66

LATERAL ACCELERATION below 500ft

67

LATERAL ACCELERATION on the Ground - DEP

68

LATERAL ACCELERATION on the Ground - ARR

69

LONGITUDINAL ACCELERATION above 500ft

70

LONGITUDINAL ACCELERATION below 500ft

71

LONGITUDINAL ACCELERATION on the Ground - DEP

72

LONGITUDINAL ACCELERATION on the Ground - ARR

73

High GROUND SPEED within 10 seconds of Airport Landing

74

High GROUND SPEED within 20 seconds of Rig Landing

75

Downwind flight within 60 seconds of Take off

76

Downwind flight within 60 seconds of Landing

77

Velocity-Normal Operation (VNO)

78

Orbit Detection

79

Rig Landing Detection

80

Helideck Movement - ROLL

81

Helideck Movement - PITCH

82

GEAR UP below 300ft on Landing

83

GEAR UP below 75ft on Take off

84

Go Around Detection

89
Operational Event Name
85

Go Around below 75ft

86

Go Around below 100ft at night

87

Taxi Speed - DEP

88

Taxi Speed - ARR

